Building the Post-Covid Next Normal through Services and Digitalization: an empirical study of Italian manufacturing companies by Mingardo, Daniele
 
 
UNIVERSITA’ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA 
 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE ED AZIENDALI “M. FANNO” 
 
 








BUILDING THE POST-COVID NEXT NORMAL              
THROUGH SERVICES AND DIGITALIZATION:  













                                                             Candidate          Mingardo Daniele   
















Alla mia famiglia, che mi ha permesso di ottenere questo traguardo 
A Cecilia, la persona più importante conosciuta durante i miei studi 



































































































Il candidato dichiara che il presente lavoro è originale e non è già stato sottoposto, in tutto 
o in parte, per il conseguimento di un titolo accademico in altre Università italiane o stra-
niere.  
Il candidato dichiara altresì che tutti i materiali utilizzati durante la preparazione dell’ela-
borato sono stati indicati nel testo e nella sezione “Riferimenti bibliografici” e che le 
eventuali citazioni testuali sono individuabili attraverso l’esplicito richiamo alla pubbli-
cazione originale.  
 
The candidate declares that the present work is original and has not already been sub-
mitted, totally or in part, for the purposes of attaining an academic degree in other Italian 
or foreign universities. The candidate also declares that all the materials used during the 
preparation of the thesis have been explicitly indicated in the text and in the section "Bib-
liographical references" and that any textual citations can be identified through an ex-














































Introduction & Summary 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Recent Crises’ Effects on Italian Companies 
1.1 Twenty years of crises: from September 11th to Covid-19 
1.2 Italian economy and companies 
1.3 Cerved relation: Italian Small and Medium enterprises 
1.4 Covid-19 crisis on Italian SMEs 
1.5 Next future for Italian SMEs 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Organizational Resilience Through Service and Digitalization 
     2.1 Organizational Resilience: literature review 
     2.2 Organizational resilience approach 
     2.3 Resilience approach in response to Covid-19 
     2.4 Resilience through service and digitalization 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Empirical Analysis: “Reagire al Covid-19 con i Servizi e la Digitalizza-
zione” 
     3.1 Methodology and survey’s structure 
     3.2 General results 
     3.3 Statistical approach 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Final results and considerations 
     4.1 The results of the survey 
     4.2 The results of the empirical elaboration 
     4.3 Limits of the empirical analysis 









Figure 1 - Real GDP Growth over the last twenty years 
Figure 2 - Real GDP Growth over the last twenty years (UE and Italy) 
Figure 3 - Active SMEs in Italy in 2018 
Figure 4 - Real Italian SMEs turnover variation % 
Figure 5 - Comparison between number of Italian SMEs and Italian GDP Growth 
Figure 6 - Turnover % variation 2019-2020 
Figure 7 - ROE Variation % (base scenario) 
Figure 8 - VIX Index 
Figure 9 - Five distinct phases and perspectives about resilience 
Figure 10 - Tension Quadrant 
Figure 11 - Conceptual framework 
Figure 12 - Elements enhancing resilience 
Figure 13 - The four stages model 
Figure 14 - Companies size 
Figure 15 - Services offered 
Figure 16 - Technologies applied 
Figure 17 - Opportunities in the future 
Figure 18 - Threats in the future 
Figure 19 - Initiatives related to product-service system 
Figure 20 - Services classification 
Figure 21 - Graphic correlation between tot_services and tot_technologies 




Table 1 - European commission classification 
Table 2 - Subdivision of Italian enterprises 
Table 3 - Correlation between number_SMEs and Italy_GDP_growth between 2010-2018 
Table 4 - Summary of literature about resilience 
Table 5 - Timeline 
VIII 
 
Table 6 - Base, intermediate and advanced services 
Table 7 - Base, intermediate and advanced companies 
Table 8 - Closed/opened companies during Covid-19 crisis 
Table 9 - Correlation between tot_services and tot_technologies 
Table 10 - Spearman’s correlation between tot_services and tot_technologies 
Table 11 - Summary of variable tot_services 
Table 12 - ANOVA test on tot_services, factor variable service_level 
Table 13 - Encoding table for services_turnover% 
Table 14 - ANOVA test on services_turnover%, factor variable service_level 
Table 15 - Summary of relation between crisis_opprotunity and crisis_threat 
Table 16 - ANOVA test on crisis_opportunity, factor variable service_level 
Table 17 - ANOVA test on crisis_threat, factor variable service_level 
Table 18 - ANOVA test on new_services_opp, factor variable service_level 
Table 19 - Encoding table for investments_budget 






















































































INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY 
 
 
During the current year, the whole world has been hit by the spread of Covid-19, an event 
that will be marked in the history books. The effects of the health crisis have been dra-
matic, and have hit all the areas of human life, severely affected by the national lockdowns 
to mitigate the outbreak. An unprecedented crisis, incomparable to the previous ones, 
destined to upset people's habits and behaviours and to redesign new balances, from an 
economic point of view but also from a social one.  
The Covid-19 will inevitably be a watershed, especially for companies characterized by 
a past of internationalisation and economic recessions. This event has inevitably put the 
organizations’ financial resources in front of an unexpected test and also to face an even 
more uncertain future, the so-called “next normal”, in which those who succeed first in 
adapting through innovative projects will build an important competitive advantage. 
Therefore, innovation represents the key point, and it can be undertaken only by resilient, 
agile, and flexible organisations, able to remain in the redesigned environment that will 
be day-by-day more competitive. 
 
THE REASON OF MY DISSERTATION 
Through this paper, a practical analysis of a manifestation of resilience is attempted, with 
the empirical analysis of companies that have adapted their business models through ser-
vices and digitalization. 
Thanks to the sample composed by 80 companies operating in North-East of Italy and 
characterized by a B2B nature, collected through a survey led by Professor Paiola from 
the University of Padua, an investigation is carried out to understand the impact of the 
pandemic on these companies, and the role that services and digitalization will have in 
the companies' programme in the post-Covid world, the “next normal”.  
Given the opportunity of having a relevant sample on a current phenomenon such as the 
pandemic crisis, the author has conducted some specific statistical elaborations in order 
2 
 
to highlight the different future perspectives of companies according to the level of ser-
vices offered. 
 
CHAPTER 1 - RECENT CRISES’ EFFECTS ON ITALIAN COMPANIES 
As mentioned, the Covid-19 crisis has reached the peak of a twenty-year period in which 
uncertainty, especially economic one, has played an important role. A high instability due 
to the most critical crises of recent years: from the 2001 Twin Towers attack, to the sub-
prime mortgage crisis in 2008 and then up to the European sovereign debt crisis in 2012. 
They have all had the common characteristic of undermining the business stability and 
specifically the one of Italian companies, among the most affected. Through the Cerved 
Report, the various effects of each crisis on SMEs are given in detail, up to the strong 
impact of the current one, differentiating between geographical areas and company struc-
ture. 
 
CHAPTER 2 - ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE THROUGH SERVICE AND DIGITAL-
IZATION 
The factor that is identified as distinctive is resilience. This concept, often abused and 
overused in recent years, is presented firstly through a literature review, and then focusing 
on the concrete ways in which an organisation can be resilient. One of the best known is 
Duchek's approach (2019) to define resilience in a company's ability to anticipate, cope 
and adapt to an external event. In this model, a specific application in tackling the Covid-
19 crisis is provided by Rapaccini et al.(2020), who identify two different moments in the 
approach to the health emergency: reacting in the short term and building resilience in the 
long term. These qualities are indispensable in the proposed four-step model (calamity, 
quick & dirty, restart and adapt) for companies in pursuing agility, preparedness, elastic-
ity and redundancy. After presenting these models, the dual role of services and digitali-
zation is introduced, identified both as enablers of resilience and both as measurers to 
understand the level of resilience in the organisations. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: “REAGIRE AL COVID-19 CON I SERVIZI E 
LA DIGITALIZZAZIONE” 
After the investigation of the role of services and digitalization through the literature, the 
survey "Reagire al Covid-19 con i servizi e la digitalizzazione" is presented, describing 
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its structure and main objectives. In the respondent companies' business, the range of 
services offered is on average less affected by the crisis than the range of products on 
offer, thus already showing a greater degree of resilience; the importance and role of cer-
tain technological equipment such as smart working platforms in managing the sudden 
emergency is also remarkable. After the decision to divide the sample into three classes, 
according to Baines' classification of services, it has been observed that in general com-
panies with a greater range of services have started this process well before the Covid-19 
crisis, and over time have gained the awareness that allows them to understand the im-
portance of services and digitalization and to see them as tools to be more and more in-
novated day-by-day. 
 
CHAPTER 4 - FINAL RESULTS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
In the conclusion, the results obtained from the survey and the relative its statistical pro-
cessing are explained. At the closing date of the report in October 2020, Covid-19 seems 
to be presenting the beginning of a new wave; the issues addressed in the survey will 
become even more topical again, and the need for companies to understand the im-
portance of innovating towards a more resilient organisational structure, e.g. through ser-
vices and digitalization, will be confirmed as indispensable. 
The next normal will change the economic system, and only those companies that can 












































RECENT CRISES’ EFFECTS ON ITALIAN COMPANIES 
 
 
1.1 TWENTY YEARS OF CRISES: FROM SEPTEMBER 11TH TO COVID-19 
 
The first twenty years of the new millennium have undoubtedly changed the history of 
the modern world. Innovation has reached levels that were unbelievable in the previous 
century, both from a technology point of view and a social one. Consequently, the eco-
nomic system has reflected these changes, with the birth of new markets following the 
continuously changing people’s needs. At the same time, not all the companies were able 
to follow the innovation process, and some of them failed, following a sort of natural 
selection process. 
These companies and organizations were not able to stay in an environment characterised 
by a high level of uncertainty, as proved by the large number of crises that happened 
during the last twenty years, and that were totally unpredictable. 
The so-called Black Swan, the metaphor that Nassim Taleb (2008), finance professor, 
writer and for many years Wall Street trader, coined for those random and unpredictable 
events, whose negative consequences are far-reaching for everyone. 
Black swans with different natures, from terrorist attacks to the pandemic, but each one 
with a common feature: the capability to bring with them a disruptive change. The most 
drastic is the one that we are living in this year: the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, able to hit 
globally human health and the economies of all countries. After the pandemic, things will 
not be as before; let us think about the use of the mask, the lack of hugs between people, 
and the smart working, all measures that in these months have become the new normality, 
and nobody knows how long they will stay in our life.  
While Covid-19 is one of the most shocking events in contemporary history, there have 
also been other crises in the last twenty years that have affected world economic growth. 
Just think of the main historical events that have characterised the new millennium, and 
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how the consequences of each one have easily proliferated throughout the world, thanks 
to the growing level of globalisation. 
Just as the new millennium began, the terrorist attack of 11th September undermined 
world security certainties. In addition to the human, political, security, and social impli-
cations of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, there were profound impacts 
on New York City’s economy, its labour market dynamics, and individual businesses. 
Airlines and insurance companies took the hardest immediate hit, and U.S. stock markets 
initially fell more than 10% during the days after. Despite its lasting impact on the Amer-
ican psyche, the economic and financial impact of 9/11 was fairly muted, with markets 
bouncing back months after to new highs. This was helped, in part, by a resilient Ameri-
can economy along with support and stimulus from the federal government (Davis, 2020). 
Anyway, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America caused significant economic damage in 
the immediate aftermath, rippling through global financial markets; in a just born Euro-
pean Union stocks markets fell, and a new climate of danger and uncertainty began to 
spread, the diffusion was also facilitated by the single currency created among all the 
countries of the Union, the Euro. 
Few years later it was the turn of the global financial crisis of 2008, the worst economic 
disaster since the Great Depression of 1929. The financial crisis stretched over more than 
a year, culminating in the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the Wall 
Street bailout that quickly followed. In the United States, the stock market plummeted, 
wiping out nearly $8 trillion in value between late 2007 and 2009. Unemployment 
climbed, peaking at 10 percent in October 2009. Americans lost $9.8 trillion in wealth as 
their home values plummeted and their retirement accounts vaporized (Merle, 2018). In 
all, the Great Recession led to a loss of more than $2 trillion in global economic growth, 
or a drop of nearly 4 percent, between the pre-recession peak in the second quarter of 
2008 and the low hit in the first quarter of 2009, according to Moody’s Analytics. While 
the Great Recession officially ended in 2009, many people felt its effects for years to 
come as the job market and home prices remained depressed.  
The effect of the American Great Recession in Europe was even more shocking: the so 
called European sovereign debt crisis, a period in which several European countries (in 
particular Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) experienced the collapse of financial 
institutions, high government debt, and rapidly rising bond yield spreads in government 
securities (in those years in Italy became famous the Spread, index between the yield of 
Italian bonds and the yield of the German ones, that reach the negative record). Countries 
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in difficulties received bailout funds from the European Central Bank in order to avoid 
the bankruptcy. As part of the loan agreements, these countries were required to meet 
austerity measures designed to slow down the growth of public sector debt. As a conse-
quence, the Mediterranean members of the EU faced intense periods of high unemploy-
ment and lack of investments for the real economy; this led firstly to a loss of confidence 
in European businesses and economies, and secondly in the European Institutions. 
This sentiment started to spread over other European countries (the movement of the so-
called Eurosceptics); in June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Un-
ion in a referendum and speculation soared that other countries would leave the EU. The 
UK referendum sent shock waves through the economy; investors fled to safety, pushing 
several governments yields to a negative value, and the British pound was at its lowest 
against the dollar. Market volatility was high in all the European markets; in the mid-
2016 in Italy the situation worsened: a staggering 17% of Italian loans, approximately 
$400 billion-worth, were junk, and the banks needed a significant bailout (Kenton, 2020). 
Thanks to the austere policies ordered by European directives, market confidence stabi-
lised, but the Italian structure was destined to remain too weak financially.  
In the following years, the worlds’ economies rose again, until the beginning of 2020, 
when the pandemic caused by Covid-19 virus started to threaten the entire world. 
The respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was first identified in December 
2019 in Wuhan, China. The World Health Organization declared it a Public Health Emer-
gency of International Concern in January 2020, and a pandemic in March. As of August 
2020, around 20 million cases of Covid-19 have been reported in more than 188 countries 
and territories (World Health Organization, 2020; Reichlin, 2019). There are several vac-
cine candidates in development, although none have completed clinical trials to prove 
their safety and efficacy; worldwide the lack of a vaccine is threatening the countries, 
especially in Europe where a potential return of the virus in winter represents a very feared 
risk. 
According to the IMF (International Monetary Fund), the impact of Covid-19 has been 
disruptive regarding also economy and sociality; it represents the largest global recession 
after the Great Depression, and it affects 265 million global famines. The measures im-
plemented by the authorities like travel restrictions, lockdowns, workplace hazard con-
trols and facility closure in order to slow the spread of the disease, have led to the cancel-
lation of cultural, religious and sporting events, widespread supply shortages exacerbated 
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by panic buying and closing of schools and universities (98% of the students population 
worldwide has been affected by these measures). 
According to the IMF, the world real GDP is estimated to decrease by 3% in 2020; worse 
the situation of developed economies (-6,1%). Euro area estimated loss of growth is 
around 7,5%, with Italy, one of the countries firstly attacked by Covid-19 and with the 
stricter legislation, at -9,1%. 
As shown in Figure 1, the estimation for 2021 predicts a partial recovery, both for emerg-
ing and developed countries. 
 
Figure 1 – Real GDP Growth over the last twenty years 




1.2 ITALIAN ECONOMY AND COMPANIES 
 
As analysed in the previous paragraph, the impact of crises in the last twenty years have 
been particularly tough for Europe, and Italy has been one of the countries most affected. 
Italian economy has suffered a general period of stagnation, characterized by low growth 
stopped by the effects of the numerous crises.  
Looking to Figure 2, the decrease in GDP of Italy has been higher than the averages of 
Euro area and of the World in each year of the last two decades, not only for Covid-19 
crisis. In 2009, for the Great Recession, Italy lost 5,3 points in growth respect to Euro 
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originated, that had a loss of 2,5 points. In 2012 Italy lived one of the most difficult mo-
ment of its history; GDP scored a – 3 points of growth, due to the concrete risk that one 
of the biggest manufacturing economies in the world could default for its unsustainable 
level of public debt. Thanks to a policy of austerity and to the help of the EU institutions, 
Italy was able to recover in the following years, but always at a slower pace than similar 
countries. 
 




There are different theories behind the reasons for the slow growth rhythm of Italian 
economy, and all of them, looking at the historical clear pattern analysed in Figure 2, 
define the reasons as structural.  
Reichlin (2019) affirms that the difficulties of Italy were born since the mid-1990s, when 
Italy entered “in a period of stagnating GDP and productivity, the so called economic 
decline”. To this decline, it has to be add that in the following years Italian policymakers 
had to make “painful and swift fiscal and institutional adjustments to correct economic 
imbalances and comply with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty”, in order to have 
the prerequisites to enter the EU. These adjustments were incomplete and did not solve 
the two main problems that explain the fragility of the Italian economy: “stagnation of 
productivity and little internal adjustments (in terms of wage dynamics and reallocation 
of labour and capital across sectors and firms) to fend off the consequences of a loss of 
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country that has a lot of difficulties to follow the new trends; Italy’s institutional model 
is inadequated to coping with the tensions generated by phenomenons like globalization, 
technological revolution and monetary/commercial integration. The Italian model is 
defined ad “dysfunctional” variant of the coordinated market economies in Northern and 
Central Europe, due to a particular “weakness of its political institutions and an extreme 
fragmentation of interests and its productive fabric”. 
Comparing some numbers between 1995 and 2016, Italy’s annual average GDP growth 
rate was just 0,5 percent, compared with 1,3 percent of Germany, 1,5 of France and 2,1 
of Spain (Reichlin, 2019). Looking in more detail, if we focus the attention on the first 
period of economic stability (1995-2007) that lasted until the financial crisis, the Italian 
GDP growth is almost in line with the other European countries (1,5 percent, as the 
German one for the same period). The main difference in growth arises in the post 
financial crisis: Italy was not able to recover as the other European countries, both as we 
have already seen for the sovereign debt crisis that affected Mediterrean countries, and 
both for the inability to use in a proper way the forces of globalisation and of new 
technologies to recover. 
At the basis of this inability could be imputed also the structure of the Italian economic 
fabric. The peculiarity of the Italian economic system is in fact to be composed almost 
entirely of micro, small and medium enterprises; looking at the last available report of 
ISTAT regarding the 2018, on a total of 4,4 millions of companies in Italy, the 95% are 
companies with less than 10 employees. 
To understand what we mean by micro, SMEs, and large companies we have just to look 
at the classification given by the European Commission, and reported in the following 
table. 
 
Table 1 – European Commission classification 
 
 CATEGORY EMPLOYEES   TURNOVER €   NET INCOME € 
 Large Enterprise > 250 or > 50 mln and > 43 mln 
SMEs 
Medium Enterprise < 250 and < 50 mln or < 43 mln 
Small Enterprise < 50 and < 10 mln or < 10 mln 
 Micro Enterprise < 10 and < 2 mln or < 2 mln 
 Source: European Commission 
 
Looking in details to the data given by ISTAT regarding the 2018 report (Table 2), we 
can make the following considerations about the Italian economic fabric: 
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▪ In Italy there are more than 4 million of enterprises, comprehending different 
types from corporations to cooperatives; 
▪ Micro enterprises represent the core of the Italian market, also in terms of people 
employed with more than 7 millions of workers; 
▪ Small and Medium enterprises are also very important; even if they represent only 
the 5% of the total number of enterprises, their aggregate contribution in terms of 
turnover is almost the 40%; 
▪ Large enterprises are few respect to the total, but they still have a great role in 
terms of  turnover. 
▪ SMEs (Small and Medium enterprises) and Micro enterprises hire almost 80% of 
workers, above the average of other EU countries (Prometeia, 2019).  
 
Table 2 – Subdivision of Italian enterprises 
   thousands  € bn  
Category 




Workers        
employed 





Large Enterprise 4.017 0,09% 3.919.422 22,67% 1081 35,50% 
Medium Enterprise 23.647 0,54% 2.300.901 13,31% 597 19,61% 
Small Enterprise 196.076 4,45% 3.505.189 20,28% 645 21,18% 
Micro Enterprise 4.180.761 94,92% 7.562.378 43,74% 722 23,71% 






Source: Author’s elaboration on ISTAT data 2018 
 
These numbers make Micro and SMEs salient features of the Italian economy and reflect 
the traditions and entrepreneurship widespread in the territories. But there is also the other 
side of the medal. As Reichlin (2019) explains, especially micro companies “invest less 
in research and development and make less use of skilled labour”; this is the starting point 
of an economic basis that is reluctant to follow the modern trends such as globalization 
and technological improvements. Most of these micro companies have a familiar 
tradition, operate in a small market and don’t have international relations. Not only 
workers are usually unskilled, but also the management. 
With respect to micro companies, different is the role of the Small and Medium 
enterprises; most of SMEs follow the modern trends and for the availability of 
information and data, can be taken as indicator to measure the effects on the Italian 
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economy. These data and information about the Italian SMEs composition are especially 
analyzed in the annual report given by Cerved. 
 
 
1.3 CERVED RELATION: ITALIAN SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
 
The relation “Rapporto Cerved PMI 2019” analyzes annually the evolution of the Italian 
small and medium enterprises. These companies (between 10 and 250 employees) are 
almost all well-structured corporations; the availability of their financial statement allows 
a deeper analysis than can investigate the financial and investing structure of these 
companies, understanding their strengths and weaknesses. With the aggregation of these 
results, it is possible to understand the key success factors of the most interesting players 
in the Italian economy. 
SMEs in Italy are in fact the mirror of the economy of the country; they represent the type 
of companies famous all over the world under the brand of “Made in Italy”. Based on 
research conducted by Kpmg, if Made in Italy was a brand, it would be the third most 
famous in the world, after Coca-Cola and Visa. Based on Google Analytics, the term 
Made in Italy appears in 141 million of pages (Noci, 2014). Made in Italy not only as 
localized production in Italy, but as perception of the product in its entirety and of values 
such as beauty, passion, creativity, luxury, culture and quality, represents an asset with 
enormous potential. 
During the last twenty years, SMEs in Italy had to deal with the difficulties and crises that 
have hit the entire Italian economy. Also about this point, SMEs can represent a good 
benchmark in analyzing how the production side of the economy has reacted to these 
difficulties.  
In order to do that, it may be useful to compare the performance of SMEs with the general 
economic trend in the last years. As a measure of the performance, it can be used the total 
number of SMEs active in the Italian market, given by Cerved report. The growth or 
decrease of enterprises, depends on the balance between the new ones that enter in the 
market or that achieve the requisites to be considered as small or medium, and the ones 






Figure 3 – Active SMEs in Italy in 2018 
 
Source: Cerved Report (2019) 
 
In Figure 3, there is the analysis of the period 2007-2018 given by the Cerved relation. In 
this period (before the Covid-19 crisis that will be analyzed specifically in the next 
paragraph) the two main economic events are the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
following sovereign debt crisis as a consequence in Europe. In 2009 the numbers of Small 
and Medium enterprises started to decrease, with a rapid fall in 2012-2013 due to the 
particular difficulties of the Italian economy (as seen before the threat of an unsustainable 
public debt). A lot of companies defaulted, and a lot of employees became unemployed. 
Since 2014, there has been a recovery in the number of enterprises, but year after year 
this growth has had a slower rhythm. Looking also to Figure 6, that analyzes tha variation 
of the total Italian SMEs turnover per year, we see that the path is the same, with a 
maximum recovery in 2015 of the 5,6%, that has slowed progressively down in the 
following years. 
One possible reason could be found in the continuous uncertainty of the markets; in recent 
years, the trade tension between the United States and China has led to slowdowns in the 
global market, with increased duties and greater export difficulties even for European 
countries. Many Italian SMEs had developed important trade relations with the Asian 
continent in the last decade, and these political conflicts have directly damaged their 
business.  
To this must be added at European level also a slowdown in the German economy, to 
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Figure 4 – Real Italian SMEs turnover variation % 
 
Source: Cerved Report (2019) 
 
In Figure 4 the red line indicates the turnover variation of SMEs in real terms, including 
the effects of the inflation during the decade. This estimation is much more reliable than 
the blue line, that indicates the same turnover variation but only on a nominal value. The 
reason behind the different reliability of the two lines is simple: if the blue one shows in 
the aggregate period 2007-2018 a total recover of 9,2% in nominal terms, the red one for 
the same period taking into account the effects of the inflation shows that in the truth there 
has been no total recover, with a decrease of -0,8% in the period. This result is important 
and fundamental in analysing the impact and the effects of the financial and sovereign 
debt crises: after 10 years, the recovery of the Italian SMEs has been only partial, and 
they have not been able to return to turnover’s level of 2007, the year before the beginning 
of the crises. 
Although the SMEs are not the totality of the Italian economy, they can be taken as a 
proxy to represent the majority of companies. 
To confirm this assumption, it may be useful to compare the variation of the total numbers 
of active Small and Medium enterprises in Italy (represented before in Figure 3, taken by 
Cerved) with the Italian GDP growth in the same years (data taken by IMF). 
In Figure 5, we see that graphically the two lines historical successions have a similar 
evolution; in details in the first years of the financial crisis, for example in 2009, the 
movement is opposite, because the first impact of the crisis was more on the financial 
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institutions. Inevitably it was only a matter of time that the crisis’ effects spread in all the 
sectors, and starting from 2010 the balance of enterprises numbers started to be negative, 
due to an higher amount of companies that failed for the almost impossible access to 
credit, and for a lower demand caused by a difficult economic general situation. Since 
2014, when the GDP started to recover with a positive growth trend, also the number of 
enterprises touched its lowest minimum, and started to recover thanks to the new eco-
nomic stimulus from which the enterprises could benefit. 
   
Figure 5 - Comparison between number of Italian SMEs and Italian GDP Growth 
  
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
To have an estimation of the graphic evolution of the two successions of data, it has been 
conducted a correlation between the two variables, presented in Table 3; excluding the 
first two years, in which the effects of the economic crisis were still to spread among 
Italian companies, the correlation in period 2010-2018 with a 0,59 indicates a common 
pattern in the two successions, confirming that the causes at the basis of the uncertainty 
of the time has impacted SMEs in a similar way as the Italian overall economy. 
 
Table 3 – Correlation between number_SMEs and Italy_GDP_growth between 2010-2018 
 
























Small and Medium Enterprises Italy GDP Growth
Italy_GDP_~h     0.5874   1.0000
 number_SMEs     1.0000
                                
               number~s Italy_~h
16 
 
Therefore, SMEs are a good indicator and the next step is to use them as a benchmark to 
analyse the impact of the current and most dramatic crisis: the Covid-19 one. 
 
 
1.4 COVID-19 CRISIS ON ITALIAN SMEs 
 
In order to understand the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis on the core of the 
Italian economy, it has been decided to take as sample for the analysis one of the most 
recent relation about the economic effects of the outbreak, the “Rapporto Regionale PMI 
2020” realized by Cerved and Confindustria. This report analyses 156 thousand of Small 
and Medium enterprises (so that have the requisites indicated in Table 1) active at the 
beginning of 2020 and that are divided in: 
• 93 thousand in the Northern regions (in the specific 53 thousand in North-West 
and 40 thousand in North-East). 
• 32 thousand in the Central regions. 
• 31 thousand in the Southern regions. 
 
It is useful to divide geographically these companies because, as we will see, they present 
different characteristics, and they react in different ways to Covid-19 crisis. 
For example, of the 224 trillion of added value created by the total of SMEs, the 67% is 
created in the North, and only the 18% and the 15% respectively in the Centre and in the 
South. On average a Northern company produces an added value of 1,6 million, 30% 
higher than one in the Centre (1,25 million) and 50% more one in the South (1,09 million). 
In the North there is also a higher average of Medium enterprises, around 20% of the 
total, with respect to 15% in the Centre and 14% in the South.  
As seen in the Cerved report of 2019, the Italian SMEs had already had signals of a slow 
growth before the pandemic exploited. In terms of turnover, estimates for 2019 are slower 
than in previous years; since 2017 the economic recovery from the financial crisis has 
been much weaker. To confirm a worrying scenario, in 2018 the increase in added value 
(4,1%) was lower than the growth in the labour cost (5,6%). Considering the net profita-
bility, measured by the economic indicator ROE, after the maximum of 2017 with an 
average of 11,7%, it started to decrease in 2018-2019, up to 9,6% in the North and even 
worse in Centre (8,7%) and South (8,1%). 
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If the slowing down in the growth of turnover and ROE indicates that the companies had 
already reached the maximum of the recovery from the financial crisis (precisely in 2017), 
their financial structure teaches us that they have learnt the lesson from the previous crisis, 
and in 2019 they are much more solid than before. Financial liabilities have increased in 
the last years, but with a slower pace respect the increase in equity; as results the ratio 
between the two has decreased, meaning a higher financial solidity of the Italian SMEs. 
To have a comparison that can help us to understand if the companies have been more or 
less ready to face the Covid-19 crisis respect to the Great Recession, the weight of finan-
cial liabilities in 2018 was at 63% (with a positive trend respect the 66% of 2017) while 
in 2007, the year before the subprime crisis, it was at 116%, almost the double. Even if 
the improvement in the financial structure has been substantial in all the regions of Italy, 
it must be denoted that there are also clear differences between the 61% of the North 
companies, and the 76% and 79% of respectively Centre and South.  
A stronger financial structure is reflected also in lower interest expenses, that in 2018 
have reached the minimum level of the last twenty years, equal to the 13% of the gross 
margin. Another indicator of financial stability is the delay of payments; in this case there 
is also an improvement in the last years, but with consistent differences between the North 
and the South. In Italy, an average of 4,9% of SMEs have delay in payments that can 
result in insolvency; in some regions of the South this level reaches the 12%.  
Financial solidity therefore presents different scenarios within the Italian territory. Some 
critical situations in the South, in correspondence with a violent shock such as Covid-19, 
could break out and put the company's liquidity in crisis. 
In fact, based on estimation of national and international institutions, Covid-19 crisis will 
have an unprecedented impact on the economy, overcoming the effects of the Great Re-
cession.  
To assess the impact of the emergency on the Italian SME system, Cerved predictive 
model was used, which is based on a very granular sector analysis of the sales perfor-
mance of over 1,500 sectors of the Italian economy.  
The model is based on a reference scenario, which estimates the impacts of Covid-19 on 
enterprises, considering the lockdown period (started the 9th March 2020) and the effects 
of government measures in a framework of progressive normalization of the national and 
international economic context. Given the high uncertainty regarding the evolution of the 
epidemic, a pessimistic scenario was also considered, in which a second wave of conta-
gion and a new lockdown in the autumn are assumed, although smaller than the first one.     
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According to this model, Italian SMEs are expected to shrink their turnover of 12.8% in 
2020, with a rebound in 2021 of 11.2%, insufficient to return beyond the levels of 2019. 
In the event of new waves of Covid-19, the decline in revenues is estimated at -18.1% for 
the current year (+16.5% in 2021). The impacts will be strongly asymmetric depending 
on the activity of the company: the forecasts are of major shocks for the sectors most 
penalized by the rules on social distancing, by the reduction of mobility, by the effects on 
international trade: for example, a decrease of 65% is expected for film projection activ-
ities and 51% for air transport. At the same time, for a small group of sectors, an increase 
in sales during the emergency is expected (+35% for online trade and +17% for artificial 
respiration devices).  
The impact of Covid-19 on the territorial systems of SMEs will strongly depend on the 
sectoral specialisation. The forecasts are of major declines throughout all Italy, with 
slightly more limited negative effects in Southern regions, which benefit from the in-
creased presence of companies in countercyclical sectors and in essential sectors, which 
did not have to close down their business during the lockdown phase. 
In the following Figure 6, are presented in detail the expected turnover variation between 
2019 and 2020, and as we can see the estimated percentage of the South regions are on 
average lower respect the others. 
 
Figure 6 - Turnover % variation 2019-2020 
 
Source: Cerved Group and Confindustria (2020) 
 
Considering the gross margin, the impact will be similar in all the regions, with an esti-
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What it will be different and most relevant is the impact on the net margin (as seen before 
measured by ROE); the weak financial structure of businesses in the Centre and South 
will inevitably penalise the cost of recourse to new debt, which is unavoidable in many 
cases to overcome the impact of the lockdown. These unforeseen high costs will reduce 
the net profitability of Southern companies more significantly. Northern companies, with 
a more stable structure, will be able to have a smaller impact, as shown in the Figure 7 
below. 
 
Figure 7 - ROE Variation % (base scenario) 
 
Source: Cerved and Confindustria (2020) 
 
In 2021 in many regions of Italy, the net margin level will be half of the one previous the 
Covid-19 crisis. 
The Covid-19 represents an unprecedented shock for Italian SMEs and for Italian com-
panies in general, which could turn into a long recession with social consequences diffi-
cult to sustain in the event of mass bankruptcies and loss of production capacity. This will 
depend both on the effectiveness of the short-term measures, with which the government 
intervened in the emergency phase to provide liquidity to the system, and on those with a 
longer horizon, aimed at securing a solid recovery and stimulating new investment. 
 
Cerved carried out an analysis on the balance sheets of SMEs indicating that more than a 
third of the 156,000 companies analysed (60,000 according to the baseline scenario and 
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crisis during 2020 as a result of Covid-19; between EUR 25 and 37 billion would be 
needed to overcome this phase, avoiding very significant social costs, with 1.8 million 
workers employed in SMEs with potential problems of liquidity.  
Even in a more pessimistic scenario, of a new lockdown in the autumn, the allocations 
declared by the Government in the context of the Decreto Cura Italia (€80 billion at the 
Central Guarantee Fund plus €30 billion endowment for SMEs) are therefore largely suf-
ficient to cover the needs of the SMEs. Even if the government's aid seems to be suffi-
cient, many companies will still get into serious difficulties. If, as seen before, the finan-
cial stability of enterprises is greater today than in 2008, it is also true that the proportion 
of weaker businesses with a debt to equity ratio in excess of 100% could see this ratio rise 
by virtue of new aid, until it becomes hardly sustainable.  
As a result of more fragile fundamentals, despite an initial revenue shock more contained 
thanks to a specialization in sectors less exposed to the impacts of the health crisis, the 
gap in terms of risk of Central-Southern regions with the rest of the country would widen 
further: in a pessimistic scenario, 26% of southern SMEs would be classified as risky 
(64.4% considering vulnerable and risky) and 22.9% of those of the Centre (58.7%), 




1.5 NEXT FUTURE FOR ITALIAN SMEs 
 
Covid-19 pandemic is having a drastic impact on the whole world. Especially in Italy, as 
seen already marked before the Covid-19 by an evident stagnation, a heavy recession is 
underway, due to the impacts generated by the administrative lockdown of many produc-
tion activities and the significant slowdown suffered by all other activities due, specifi-
cally, to the prevention, sanitation and physical distancing measures imposed at all stages 
of the production and logistics chains. That was also due to a general and inevitable fall 
in international and domestic demand, especially for capital goods and consumer goods, 
because of the collapse in turnover and income. 
One of the main problems with this crisis is the uncertainty related to the future and con-
sequently how long the economy will need to recover.  
As analysed before, in 2017 the Italian economy had not yet been able to recover from 
the 2008’s Financial Crisis, and in 2018 it started a period with lower growth due to the 
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commercial tensions. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the time needed to recover from 
a crisis even worse. 
At the basis there is the uncertainty that has characterized the first twenty years of the 
new millennium; a redundancy of crisis with different natures.  
Knight (1921) gives an historical definition of uncertainty as a lack of any quantifiable 
knowledge about some possible occurrence and, acknowledging some fundamental de-
gree of ignorance, an essential unpredictability of future events (LeRoy & Singell, 1987). 
Defining uncertainty in these terms, it is easy to see that it is a variable strongly permeated 
by the current economic environment and which is perhaps the most decisive factor in the 
slowness characterising the post-crisis recovery phase. For this reason, it is useful to have 
a quantitative indicator able to give an estimation of uncertainty. The most known is the 
VIX index, a real-time market indicator representing the market's expectations for vola-
tility over the coming 30 days. Created by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), 
it provides a measure of market risk and investors’ sentiments, associating volatility with 
future uncertainty. Even if it is associated with the American economy, thanks to the 
globalization and to the connection of the economies between various commercial rela-
tions, it can be used as a good proxy for the uncertainty worldwide,  
In the following Figure 8, it is reported the trend of the VIX index since its creation. As 
we can easily see, the two peaks refer to two most dangerous crises: the financial and 
pandemic one. But it is also easy to see that the index scored on average higher values 
since the starting of the new millennium, characterising 20 years of uncertainty with re-
spect to the time before.  
 
Figure 8 - VIX Index 
 




And the uncertainty is forecasted also in the near future; the most concrete threat is a new 
lockdown in autumn, with a new wave of economic depression and stop in consumption. 
And other crises are already on the horizon. Covid-19 has exposed the weaknesses of 
globalisation, and there is uncertainty about when and how relations between the various 
continents will return. Moreover, a future environmental crisis due to climate change is 
increasingly realistic; the price of oil has recently reached an all-time low, and the gov-
ernments of the various nations can no longer avoid looking for concrete solutions to-
wards a more sustainable world. A world in which new balances will probably reign, 
something that at present is difficult to predict (Serafini, 2020). 
The natural question that arises is therefore how to react to this future uncertainty to the 
so-called next normal that will characterize the world after Covid-19. 
The first step is to adapt the Italian context. In Italian history, political and legislative 
succession have been sources that have increased uncertainty even more, rather than de-
creasing it. A series of governments have alternated, often proving to be unsuitable for 
implementing structural reforms capable of solving fundamental problems such as bu-
reaucratisation, which discouraged economic activity in Italy. One example was the man-
agement of the pandemic emergency: through the "Decreto Rilancio" the government 
was able to allocate funds to support businesses quite immediately, but a further "Decreto 
Semplificazione" was needed to ensure that this liquidity was effectively accessible to 
companies. 
This is why at the same time Covid-19 could represent an opportunity for Italy: the pos-
sibility of creating an investment plan that is consistent with the far-reaching structural 
reforms that are needed with a new perspective of regional development and territorial 
cohesion needed to promote a national policy for SMEs, and that is capable of integrating 
the major goals dictated by the EU (sustainability, resilience and digitalisation) (Cerved 
Group and Confindustria, 2020). Only in this way will it be possible to bridge the gap 
between companies in the North and South; a gap that otherwise will continue to wide for 
each future crisis. 
At the basis of this economic gap between Northern and Southern companies, there is the 
second step in understanding how to react to future uncertainty. Northern companies seem 
to have different characteristics, which have allowed them to react better to the continuous 
past and, as seen, to the current crisis. These characteristics are often identified in more 
dynamic, enterprising and robust companies; more resilient companies (CUOA Business 
School, 2018). Resilience is a very topical concept and together with sustainability and 
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digitalization are the directives provided by the EU that companies should follow (Cerved 
Group and Confindustria, 2020). In the next chapter we will analyse it in detail, starting 
from a literature review and then understand in concrete terms what are the resilient ap-


























































2.1 ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In recent years, the concept of resilience has become very widespread, even in everyday 
speech, and in some cases, it is often abused. Often resilience has been defined as the 
fundamental characteristic that individuals and organisations must have in order to over-
come the increasing number of crises, even if it is difficult to study the concept properly 
and specifically investigate the concrete characteristics that make possible for an individ-
ual or organization to be resilient. 
Therefore, it is useful to carry out a literature review of the evolution of the concept to 
date, and then focus specifically on the resilience of companies, the organizational resil-
ience. 
The term resilience has been around since the 1600’s and comes from the Latin term 
“resilire” meaning to recoil or to rebound (MacMillan Dictionary, 2019). By the 19th 
century it had evolved to include a sense of elasticity; in 1973 Holling, an ecology scholar, 
classified two aspects of resilience: the first is Engineering resilience defined as the time 
an object takes to return to a state of equilibrium and the second is Ecological resilience 
defined as the amount of shock a system can absorb before it breaks down (Holling, 
1973).  
Another of the first applications of the concept occurs in psychology: resilience is a con-
cept that indicates the ability to deal positively with traumatic events, to positively reor-
ganize one's life in the face of difficulties, to rebuild oneself while remaining sensitive to 
the positive opportunities that life offers, without alienating one's identity. Resilient peo-
ple are those who, immersed in adverse circumstances, succeed, despite everything and 
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sometimes against all odds, in coping effectively with setbacks, giving new life to their 
own existence and even reaching important goals.  Applied to an entire community or 
society, rather than to a single individual, the concept of resilience is affirming itself in 
the analysis of social contexts following serious natural disasters or due to human activi-
ties such as, for example, terrorist attacks, revolutions or wars (Vale & Campanella, 
2005). 
From the original psychological meaning the concept has also spread to the economic 
one. Therefore, an organization (enterprise, company and similar) is resilient when it can 
face risks, seizing opportunities even in negative situations. In practice, it knows how to 
evolve out of a crisis as it can manage change. 
The developments about resilience in business and management research are analysed 
properly by Linnenluecke (2017) that come back to the main literature about the topic. In 
the evolution of the concept, the author covers five different streams of resilience as con-
cept: 
• the first one as organizational response to external threats,  
• the second as organizational reliability,  
• the third as employee strengths,  
• the fourth as adaptability of business models and  
• the last one as design principles that reduce supply chain vulnerabilities and dis-
ruptions.  
 
The conceptual origins are attributed to Staw et al (1981) and Meyer (1982), who both 
published on the “Administrative Science Quarterly”, but with a different point of view 
on how organizations respond to external threat. While Staw et al (1981) suggested that 
an external threat automatically places an organization at risk, Meyer (1982) contradicted 
the proposition affirming that organizations have two different types of responses: they 
can either absorb the impact of the environmental shocks by undergoing first-order 
change and single-loop learning (labelled “resiliency”), or they can adopt new practices 
or configurations through second-order change and double-loop learning (labelled “re-
tention”). He further concluded that resilience is influenced by an organization’s strategy 
and its slack resources, while retention is shaped by an organization’s ideologies and con-
strained by organizational structures.  
Between 1989 and 1990, large-scale external events such as Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez, 
Bhopal, and the Space Shuttle Challenger, shifted the interest in research to resilience as 
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reliability. Charles Perrow (1984) is one of the main contributors of this research, and he 
focused on the reliability of the new high-risk technologies that have caused some of the 
industrial accidents mentioned before. In his view these high-risk technological systems 
are vulnerable to failure because they are becoming increasingly complex and difficult 
for personnel to operate. Wildavsky (1990) put greater attention on operational safety and 
reliability in organizations; after the analysis of the considerable degree of safety that the 
society had thus far achieved, he concluded that resilience is “the capacity to cope with 
unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back” 
(Wildavsky, 1990). This definition described resilience as a generalized capacity to learn 
and to act without knowing in advance the situation or event that needs to be acted upon; 
this will be defined as an important aspect of High Reliability Organizing. 
One of the following most cited contributions is the paper by Weick and Roberts (1993) 
in which the authors  suggested  that  high-reliability organizations enact aggregate mental 
processes (information processes, heedful action and mindful attention) that are more 
fully developed than those in organizations that are primarily concerned with efficiency.  
The research on high-reliability organizations continued, and in 2001 Weick & Sutcliffe 
defined the High-Reliability Organizations (HROs) as those able to preserve flexibility in 
face of disturbances, and they prefer to respond with new learning rather than new rules 
or procedures. In HROs there is the first clear link between resilience and flexibility or 
adaptation and the necessity of the organizations to be ready and dynamic to the uncer-
tainty of the environment.  
With the 9/11 2001 disaster, there was a new stimulus in resilience research, and the at-
tention shifted to coping mechanisms and response strategies under conditions of uncer-
tainty, or even worse as in the case of the terrorist attack, under conditions of emergency. 
A new stream of resilience research can be found in the works of Coutu (2002) and Lu-
thans (2002) that put their attention on the potential of building resilience through em-
ployees’ strengths. Couto analysed the capabilities of Morgan Stanley’s employees in 
evacuating the offices of the World Trade Center just one minute later the impact of the 
plane; the company, one of the most famous investment bank with at the time 2.700 em-
ployees in 22 floors of the Center, lost only seven employees despite receiving an almost 
direct hit.  
Luthans proposed research on how to develop and manage psychological strengths in 
employees. He defined resiliency as follow: “the capability of individuals to cope suc-
cessfully in the face of significant change, adversity, or risk” and as “the positive 
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psychological capacity to rebound, to ‘bounce back’ from adversity, uncertainty, conflict, 
failure or even positive change, progress and increased responsibility” (Luthans, 2002). 
Organizations are assumed to be able to build psychological capital through developmen-
tal processes, which improve employees’ abilities to cope with change, adversity, or risk.  
The following stream of research regards the adaptability of business models, with a se-
ries of publications that focus on how companies adjust, adapt, and reinvent their business 
models in an ever-changing environment. 
Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) define resilience as “the maintenance of positive adjustments 
under positive conditions” (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). These adjustments are the response 
to small interruptions and bigger disruptions due to exogenous events; organizations are 
more likely to be successfully resilient if they create the continuing ability to use internal 
and external resources to resolve issues. 
Similarly, Hamel and Välikangas (2003) suggested innovation as another enabling con-
dition, as it allows organizations to constantly anticipate and continuously adapt to a 
broad new range of turbulence. 
Gittel et al. (2006) sum up all these theories in defining the viable business model, that 
allows organizations to collect financial resources in order to provide a strong commit-
ment to employees during times of crises, and sustain relationships that act as enabling 
conditions for organizations to return quickly to full performance.  
The last stream focuses on the resilient supply chain design: after 9/11 it was revealed the 
vulnerability of highly related supply networks. Jüttner and Maklan (2011) identified the 
main capabilities that lead to a resilient supply chain: flexibility or redundancy (modular 
designs, diversification across suppliers, multiple transport or production processes), ve-
locity/reaction speed, access to timely information, and collaboration among supply chain 
members. For the authors, only thanks to these resilient capabilities, organizations can 
avoid or limit the impacts of adverse events on revenue, cost, and lead time. 
To sum up the bibliographic research about the evolution of the resilience concept, it 









Table 4 – Summary of literature about resilience 
 
Stream of Research Author and year Contribution 
Resilience as organizational        
response to external threats 
Staw & et al., 1981 
External threat automatically places 
organization at risk. 
Meyer, 1982 
Resilience influenced by the organi-
zation’s strategy and resources. 
Resilience as organizational        
reliability 
Perrow, 1984 Reliability of high-risk technologies. 
Wildavsky, 1990 
Resilience as learning to bounce 
back. 
Weick & Roberts, 1993 Mental processes in HROs. 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001 
HROs: resilience as flexibility and ad-
aptation. 
Resilience through                      
employees’ strengths 
Coutu, 2002 Importance of employee capabilities. 
Luthans, 2002 
Resilience as capability of individuals 
to cope successfully in face of risk. 
Resilience as adaptability of       
Business Models 
Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003 
Resilience as maintenance of positive 
adjustments. 
Hamel & Välikangas, 2003 
Resilience as innovation to anticipate 
turbulences. 
Gittel, et al., 2006 
Availability of financial resources to 
provide commitment to employees. 
Resilient supply chain Jüttner & Maklan, 2011 
Main capabilities that lead to a resili-
ent supply chain. 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
After the five streams of resilience research just analysed, the studies followed new di-
rections, with a new line of researchers that put more attention on resilience as the capa-
bility to react and detect a threat. A threat that today is more probable due to the growing 
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uncertainty of the last decade (as seen in the first chapter), that has placed the concept of 
resilience as increasingly modern and current.  
In addition to the literature about resilience as general concept and organizational resili-
ence, some literature has started to analyse the role of entrepreneurship and enterprise 
resilience, trying to find out what are the main characteristics that make the individual, 
before the organization, resilient. 
 
From the examination of the resilience research that followed the five streams analysed 
in detail, some conclusions can be made: 
1. Resilience research has been highly context-dependent; depending on the context, 
resilience has been conceptualized in several different ways. For example, some 
studies view resilience as a way of engaging positively with internal or external 
failures, while other studies suggest that resilience is a way to avoid, resist or 
buffer against external impacts by implementing design principles. Another con-
ceptualization emphasizes that resilience involves recovering from extreme events 
and disasters, the so-called bouncing back. It is not clear if all these contexts are 
complementary or competing. 
2. Studies on resilience often propose ways of arranging and accumulating assets 
and resources that will be invested in the organization and in the individuals in 
order to become more resilient. Often quoted are the concepts of financial reserve 
and slack/redundant resources, that must be collected with this aim.  
3. Rarely the conceptualization of resilience has translated in operationalization. De-
pending on the different types of organizations and their different resources, it is 
difficult to detect in detail the ways in which a company or an individual can be 
more resilient. Literature is lacking in empirically providing the theories; in other 
words, there is little on how organizations can achieve resiliency. 
 
Therefore, the managerial challenge is transforming organizational resilience from a set 
of redundant preventive actions, involving resources management, into a proactive strat-
egy funded on a set of practices capable of fostering daily effectiveness of operations and 
processes. 
In order to do that, it is needed a deeper analysis and a new approach to the concept, 
capable to resume all the previous conceptualizations and to adapt to the challenges of 
today and of the next future. 
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2.2 ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE APPROACH 
 
As discussed in the section before, resilience is a complex and dynamic concept.  Sophis-
ticated concepts are characterized by different elements or attributes, and as we have seen 
the literature give different interpretations. The thinking on organizational resilience has 
naturally evolved over time and can be split by two core drivers: defensive (stopping bad 
things happen) and progressive (making good things happen), as well as a division be-
tween approaches that call for consistency and those that are based on flexibility.  
Professor David Denyer (2017) of the Cranfield School of Management analyses the last 
forty years of resilience research, identifying five distinct phases, with five contrasting 
perspectives (Figure 9); the first two phases are driven by a defensive perspective based 
on loss avoidance and value preservation. 
 
Figure 9 – Five distinct phases and perspectives about resilience  
 
 
Source: Organizational Report – A summary of academic evidence. Denyer (2017) 
 
• Preventative control. Resilient organizations take precautionary measures in face 
of potential problems; basic activities as monitoring and complying and more spe-
cifically physical barriers, redundancy, systems back-ups and standardized proce-
dures protect the organization and allow it to bounce back from disruptions and 
to restore a stable state. Defensive + consistent. 
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• Mindful action. Organizational resilience is produced by people, who notice and 
react to threats, and respond effectively to unfamiliar or challenging situations; 
when employees have experiences that add to their growth, competence/expertise, 
and efficacy they are more likely to exercise behaviours such as judgement, dis-
cretion and imagination. Defensive + flexible. 
 
The next two phases do not stop to bounce back but recognize that a resilient organization 
needs also to bounce forward, to grow and to prosper in the future. 
• Performance optimization. Organizational Resilience is formed by continually 
improving, refining and extending existing competencies, enhancing ways of 
working and exploiting current technologies to serve present customers and mar-
kets; optimization also of processes becomes the key word that controls the 
change when it occurs. Progressive + consistent. 
• Adaptive innovation. Organizational Resilience is created through creating, in-
venting, and exploring unknown markets and new technologies. Organizations 
can be the disruption in their environment; the main ability is to adapt to the rapid 
production of knowledge and innovation of today’s business environment. Pro-
gressive + flexible. 
 
Thinking on Organizational Resilience has been split between behaviours that are defen-
sive (stopping bad things happen) and those that are progressive (making good things 
happen), as well as between behaviours that are consistent and those that are flexible. 














Figure 10 – Tension Quadrant 
 
 
Source: Organizational Report – A summary of academic evidence. Denyer (2017) 
 
These perspectives and behaviours have been a source of disagreement and misunder-
standing; therefore, most recently a new fifth strand of thinking on organizational resili-
ence has emerged that integrates, balances, and seeks fit between the other four perspec-
tives. 
• Paradoxical thinking. Organizational Resilience is achieved by balancing preven-
tative control, mindful action, performance optimization and adaptive innovation, 
and managing the tensions inherent in these distinct perspectives. 
 
From these perspectives, and thanks to the paradoxical thinking, the capability to merge 
and integrate them, we are ready to focus in concrete to a new conceptualization of or-
ganizational resilience that defines a set of capabilities by which firms anticipate, cope 
with and learn from unexpected events. These three dimensions of organizational resili-
ence can be distinguished, since resilient organizations respond not only to current or past 
issues, but also to the future one.  
Duchek (2019), after having recognized that most of the past resilience literature is per-
spective and normative, defines two potential approaches that can describe a more con-
crete resilience: (1) processual approach that define different resilience stages and recog-
nize the dynamic nature of the concept and (2) academic approach that provide insight 
into internal workings of resilience. In combination these two approaches can foster a 
comprehensive understanding of the resilience phenomenon with the aim to develop a 
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conceptual framework that illustrates the main stages of the resilience process and points 
to underlying capabilities that together constitute the meta-capability of organizational 
resilience. At the basis of this framework there is the interaction between the organization 
and the environment. 
 
Figure 11 - Conceptual framework 
 
Source: Organizational resilience: a capability-based conceptualization. Duchek (2019) 
 
Duchek (2019) analyses and recalls three successive resilience stages (anticipation, cop-





1. Anticipation capabilities 
 
Anticipation is the first dimension of organizational resilience and it refers to the ability 
to detect critical developments within the firm or in its environment and to adapt proac-
tively. Some firms can see the unexpected faster than others, and they are able to imme-
diately react to it while others “wait and see”. Systems need anticipation capabilities to 
avoid threatening situations or at least minimize potential negative consequences.  
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Anticipation stage comprises three specific capabilities: the ability to observe internal and 
external developments, the ability to identify critical developments and potential threats, 
and as far as possible to prepare for unexpected events. 
In literature, the activity of observation and identification is also called as environmental 
scanning, that means acquiring information that involves exposure to and perception of 
information. To gather this information, some practiced routines can be useful, like mar-
ket research, end-user surveys and the use of gatekeepers. 
In addition to the observation and identification of actual changes and upcoming crisis, a 
focus on potential future developments is important. For example, scenario planning prac-
tices can help firms to think about different futures - even if they are unrealistic or un-
thinkable - and ways to handle them. 
Preparation derives from the literature and specific ability of HROs. High-reliability or-
ganizations are technologically complex organizations operating in high-risk environ-
ments, in which even small failures can have dramatic consequences (e.g., nuclear power 
plants, aircraft carriers, or chemical firms). In such organizations, failure prevention takes 
top priority and performance reliability rivals’ productivity as a dominant goal. Being 
prepared means that a company is equipped to deal with unforeseen adversity, and it is 
ready to capitalize on unexpected opportunities. 
 
 
2. Coping capabilities 
 
In addition to anticipation and preparation for critical events, resilience means also coping 
with unanticipated dangers before they have become manifest (Wildavsky, 1990). The 
overall ability to cope with the unexpected is closely related to crisis management and 
can be separated into two sub-categories: the ability to accept a problem and the ability 
to develop and implement solutions. 
Often organizations require too much time to realize and act on unexpected events, and 
only if they develop the ability to accept, they can face critical situations and react 
quickly. The acceptance dimension of organizational resilience consists of three ele-
ments: understanding the environment in which the system operates, defining a reference 
state for the system, and being aware of and accepting system failures. These elements 
show some overlap with the previously discussed anticipation capabilities. Thus, it can 
be assumed that anticipation and coping capabilities are closely connected, and that the 
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promotion of anticipation capabilities may also have positive effects on the ability to ac-
cept a problem.  
When a crisis occurs, organizations must put their crisis plans into action and develop ad 
hoc solutions that always result as a combination of sensemaking and acting. Sensemak-
ing means that individuals or groups try to make things rationally accountable to them-
selves and others. Only if people understand the crisis situation, they can act on it.  
The ability to develop solutions depends essentially on two factors: idea generation, that 
can be realized through different techniques such as bricolage/improvisation, and more 
important the coordination of these ideas. A good balance between formal structures and 
clear responsibilities and openness and freedom for flexible and creative action needs to 
be found.  
Last step regards the implementation of the solution, seen as the ability of an organization 
to realize a previously developed solution. Especially crisis requires precise and quick 
implementation. In order that these solutions will lead to the change, they must be widely 
accepted and adopted. 
 
 
3. Adaptation capabilities 
 
Beside the first two phases, resilience also includes the ability to adapt to critical situa-
tions and to use change for own purposes. Adaptation is defined as long-term learning; 
learning in the aftermath of a crisis starts with the reflection and the evaluation of the 
disaster, its causes, and effects. 
Adaptation includes two types of learning: reflection and learning, and organizational 
change capabilities. 
Reflection process includes four stages: articulation of the problem, analysis of the prob-
lem, formulation of a theory to explain the problem, and action. Learning that does not 
only refer to internal practices, but that look also to the external: for example, organiza-
tions can learn from the vicariously experienced incidents from related or similar organ-
izations. 
Organizational change can only be achieved by a higher-level learning which results in 
the development of new norms, values, and practices. To produce organizational change, 
it is particularly important to act on previously generated knowledge. Organizations must 
be able to exploit a newly developed solution and transfer it to their individual parts. To 
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achieve that, change management capabilities are needed. Soft managerial practices such 
as effective communication and relationships within the organization seem to be particu-
larly important to enhancing an organization’s resilience. 
 
It is important to highlight that the three stages cannot be separated; they show some 
overlaps and they strongly depend on each other at the point that they build on each other 
(anticipation influences coping, and coping influences adaptation). However, there is also 
backward influence. Organizations need to develop capabilities of all three resilience 
stages that together form the meta-capability of organizational resilience.  
As seen, the resilience capabilities are extremely complex and deeply embedded in social 
contexts; this is why Duchek (2019) defines some main antecedents (knowledge base) 
and drivers (resource availability, social resources and power/responsibility) that help to 
understand better the concept: 
• An organization’s knowledge base is an important antecedent of organizational 
resilience. It builds the foundation for the anticipation of critical developments 
(as well as coping and adaptation). In turn, an organization’s knowledge base 
may be enhanced through the accomplishment of the three resilience stages. 
• Resource availability positively influences the resilience of organizations. 
Specifically, it fosters the development of anticipation capabilities (as well as cop-
ing and adaptation capabilities). 
• Social resources positively influence the resilience of organizations. Specifically, 
those resources foster the development of coping capabilities. 
• Power based on expertise and shared responsibilities positively influence the re-
silience of organizations. Specifically, they foster the development of adaptation 
capabilities. 
 
After these clarifications, Duchek (2019) concludes his paper highlighting the need for 
more empirical studies by investigating the presence or absence of organizational resili-
ence by retrospective analysis after a threatening situation. The pandemic Covid-19 rep-
resents the perfect case to study how organizations have responded to a crisis with un-
foreseeable consequences. 
To summing up the literature review conducted on the evolution of resilience’s concept, 




“The organizational resilience is the organization’s ability to anticipate potential threats, 




2.3 RESILIENCE APPROACH IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 
 
The literature review just conducted about the concept of organizational resilience is now 
applied to the most drastic crisis of the year: the pandemic one. As seen in the first chapter, 
Covid-19 pandemic has represented a disruptive crisis with unpredictable consequences, 
especially as the economic breakdown has affected the entire world. Customer demand 
and confidence and industrial production have collapsed reaching negative records above 
all in the Eurozone and US. 
Focusing on the manufacturing sector, one of the most affected by the crisis according to 
the International Labour Organization (2020), servitization – the shift from a product-
centric to a service-centric business model and logic (Kowalkowski, et al., 2017) – has 
often been a lifeline in helping manufacturing firms to stabilize their businesses in turbu-
lent times (Kwak & Kim, 2016). This is what happened with the financial crisis of 2008-
09, when even if a buyer could not afford to buy a new product for a short in liquidity, 
the products in use still required regular service; this to testify that the service side of a 
business was much less disrupted, and the providing of high-margin field services such 
as maintenance, repair and overhaul (Kowalkowski & Ulaga, 2017) have let manufactur-
ing companies to survive in their worst times.  
But the Covid-19 has presented different characteristics: the lockdown, the interruption 
of supply chain and the general imposition on travels that have made impossible the prox-
imity to the customers have consequently affected not only the product businesses but 
also the service ones. In this context for example also the field services have been unfea-
sible. 
One possible solution to overcome these difficulties and that can let the firms recover and 
return to a “next normal” and build resilience is found in the digital servitization. “Digital 
servitization is a service strategy that exploits extensively digital breakthroughs such as 
smart connected products, industrial internet platforms, predictive analytics, digital of-
ferings, and advanced services” (Paschou, et al., 2020). Only by adding digitalization to 
a business model focused on servitization can companies overcome Covid-19’s barriers. 
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Rapaccini et al. (2020) in their paper “Navigating disruptive crises through service-led 
growth: The impact of COVID-19 on Italian manufacturing firms” provide guidelines on 
how industrial firms can react against disruptive crises like Covid-19, differentiating the 
impact of product and service businesses. The authors point out on two different times 
how organizations react to Covid-19: 
• In the short term the attention is on how firms can recover faster. 
• In the longer term the attention is on how firms can become more resilient. 
 
After an empirical part with the findings about the impact of Covid-19 on a dataset of 
companies of North-Italy (the European region first and most extensively affected by the 
pandemic), the core of the research is the elaboration of a four-stage model for managing 
crises such as Covid-19.  
At the basis of this model, there is (as it has been for the Duchek’s approach (2019)) the 
conceptualization of resilience, through its defining elements. Rapaccini et al. (2020), 
starting from the idea that servitization itself is a way to adapt to a new disruptive envi-
ronmental change, identify four key elements to enhance resilience (Figure 12): 
 
Figure 12 – Elements enhancing resilience   
 
 
Source: Navigating disruptive crises through service-led growth: The impact of COVID-19 on Italian man-
ufacturing firms. Rapaccini et al. (2020) 
 
• Agility is the ability of an organization to adapt or respond rapidly to a changing 
environment both in terms of volume and variety, which is fundamental in situa-
tions of high uncertainty like a crisis. 
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• Preparedness is the ability of an organization to be ready to satisfy the new needs 
that may arise after a crisis, from a change in the business model to a search of 
new opportunities or new ideas. 
• Elasticity is the ability of an organization to increase the exchangeability and flex-
ibility of relationships among people and things. 
• Redundancy is the ability of an organization to have slack of modular resources 
(as production facilities or stock of materials) that can be rapidly activated to re-
configure the value network. 
 
A specific element of resilience is assigned to each stage of the four-stage model, elabo-
rated from the authors in order to provide a useful tool to support the management of any 
organizations in case of emergency or disruptive events, irrespective of its cause. 
The model (Figure 13) has four phases – calamity, quick and dirty, restart, adapt to next 
normal – described in detail as follow: 
 
Phase 1: Calamity  
 
The first phase concerns awareness of the phenomenon, the so-called Black Swan (Taleb, 
2008); the priority for the managers of companies was to understand this new type of 
crisis, collect the related risks and needs and elaborate different potential scenarios. In 
this phase to react against Covid-19, all firms activated task forces and crisis units for the 
daily management of the emergency at both the local level and the corporate level. Except 
in rare cases, the central task forces had no operational responsibilities and tasks, being 
mostly limited to gathering information, coordinating decisions, and transferring 
knowledge (Rapaccini, et al., 2020). At this stage, the attention on the impacts on products 
and services has been the same. This stage is in line with the concept of preparedness. 
 
Phase 2: Quick and dirty 
 
This phase corresponds to the ability to implement simple solutions to provide the conti-
nuity of the business, as much as possible. Thanks to the incredible spirit of cooperation 
and support between all the parties of the company involved, the implementation of these 
quick and dirty solutions was much easier. There is no time to develop new solutions; or 
this reason, firms tried to make the most of the resources and technologies they had 
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already developed or introduced (Rapaccini, et al., 2020). As an example of this, the more 
consolidated technologies were the one that have been subject to the highest acceleration, 
like for example the smart working. This stage is in line with the concept of agility. 
 
Phase 3: Restart 
 
On May 4th, 2020, the industrial businesses in Italy were reactivated, although with obli-
gations to ensure social distancing and workers protection. In this stage it was fundamen-
tal to design the most flexible new business architecture to effectively secure the working 
environment with the lowest impact on performance, costs and delivery times. In this 
stage the main concept is elasticity, especially referred to potential scenarios like persis-
tence of limitations and potential lockdown’s bounce back in the next months. 
 
Phase 4: Adapt to the next normal 
 
Post-Covid-19 world will not be the same, and companies therefore need to be ready to 
evolve and adapt. Organizations need to be more resourceful and in general more resili-
ent; the major changes will be reflected in logistic pipelines (the threat of supply chain 
interruptions will move from globalization to regionalization), in reorganization of the 
workplace (boom of the remote working), in digitalization (the overcome of last barriers 
to the digital technologies), in competitiveness of product-service solutions (more bun-
dled offerings consisting of both traditional services and new digital components) and in 
opportunities for new full-risk and outcome-based solutions (offer of risk-mitigation-re-
lated services to cover the uncertainty and potential disruptions of a Covid-19 bounce 
















Source: Navigating disruptive crises through service-led growth: The impact of COVID-19 on Italian man-
ufacturing firms. Rapaccini et al. (2020) 
 
 
2.4 RESILIENCE THROUGH SERVICES AND DIGITALIZATION 
 
In the previous two paragraphs have been analysed two different models that explain how 
an organization must approach a disruptive event like a crisis. The model proposed by 
Duchek (2019) at three step – anticipation, coping, adaptation – and the model at four-
stage proposed by Rapaccini et al. (2020) – calamity, quick and dirty, restart, adapt to 
next normal – present similar characteristics; it can be said that the Duchek’s model rep-
resent the general case, while the Rapaccini ones a specific application for Covid-19 cri-
sis. The four-stage model in fact has been designed to cope with an urgent situation, and 
to provide a useful tool to organizations that were suffering the disruptive effects of the 
pandemic. Based on a dataset composed on Northern Italy companies, the results can be 
“relevant also for firms in other countries and regions that have (so far) not experienced 
43 
 
the same radical lockdown measures or economic devastation as well as for situations 
involving building long-term resilience (with its diverse nuances) and preparing for fu-
ture pandemics and economic crises” (Rapaccini, et al., 2020). 
In the four-stage model, the conclusion focuses on the importance of digital services to 
enable a different type of revenues and growth (respect to the classic one linked to the 
physical product) that is more resilient to the impact of crises.  
The main concept here is that through service and digitalization companies can be more 
resilient, and at the same time analysing the level of service and digitalization of a com-
pany could be a good proxy to measure the level of resiliency. 
 
The measure of resilience is in fact another important issue to deal with. The quantifica-
tion or the individuation of the main variables that affect the organizational resilience are 
very difficult to be found, since the resilience concept is defined variably in different 
contexts.  
In the past literature there are various proposed techniques to compute the intensity of 
resilience, some of them based on indicators, organizational outcomes, or organizational 
recovery. 
 
Measurement based on indicators 
There are two main streams: the measurement of organizational resilience potential and 
the measurement of resilience after a disruptive event has occurred. Lee et al. (2013) pro-
vide a complete benchmark tool to do the evaluation process analysing through a pro-
posed questionnaire adaptive capacity and planning of the organization. 
 
Measurement based on the organizational outcomes 
Watanabe et al. (2004) proposed to use the Operating Income to Sales to measure resili-
ence. If the sales come from the operating income of the company, so the core business 
is generating revenues, the firm should be in a good situation. Dalziell & McManus 
(2004) suggested measuring resilience based on Key Performance Index (KPIs) defined 
considering the organization’s objectives. Normally KPIs are various and different de-
pending on the company. There are financial KPIs as profit, cost, COGS, day sales out-
standing or sales by region. These if we are dealing with operational indicators. Other 
commonly important are cash flow from financing activities to demonstrate an 
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organization’s financial strength, or EBITDA measurement of revenue after expenses are 
considered and interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization are excluded.  
Markman & Venzin (2014) suggested measuring resilience following a more stock-based 
approach, considering the Return on Equity (ROE) and volatility. ROE is considered a 
measure of how effectively management is using a company’s assets to create profits. 
Return on equity (ROE) deemed good or bad will depend on what is normal for a stock’s 
peers. Volatility is the degree of variation of a trading price series over time as measured 
by the standard deviation of logarithmic returns. The higher the volatility, the riskier is 
the stock and so the company. A low volatility suggests a good stock performance and so 
lower possibility of default. 
 
Measurement based on the organizational recovery 
For this type of measurement, organizations need to suffer failures to assess their resili-
ence. Rose & Liao (2005) propose to determine a quotient of failure probability, reduced 
consequences from failure, and reduced time to recover. Probability of failure is selected 
as a metric which indicates the ability to prevent disruptive events, reduced consequences 
from failure is a metric of the ability to prevent the consequences of that disruptive event, 
and finally the reduced recovery time is the metric for ability to recover from a disruptive 
event. Westrum (2006) classifies disruptive events based on their predictability, their po-
tential to disrupt a system, and the origin of that disruptive event whether it is internal or 
external.  
To measure the level of resilience after a disruptive event, Henry & Ramirez-Marquez 
(2012) propose to evaluate the level of recovery of the organization against its losses. 
They suggest measuring resilience quantitatively as the ratio of Recovery and Loss. 
Loss is the deterioration from the original state after the disruption and Recovery is the 
amount it bounces back from the disruptive state to the recovered state. The authors 
acknowledge that the limitation is to not to consider the money and time to recover. They 
do not consider what we should evaluate to measure loss and recovery. 
Erol, Henry, Sauser, et al. (2010) also include the recovery time, the initial vulnerability 
and the potential loss averted. They proposed to measure resilience based on recovery 
time, level of recovery, initial vulnerability and potential loss averted. However, they do 
not indicate how to assess these items and the importance to define start and stop points 




All these techniques analysed are proposals that are valid depending on the resilience 
context; they are based on indicators, outcomes, or recovery time, but none of them give 
a complete and certain measure of resilience.  
And this is also the case of thinking about resilience in terms of service and digitalization; 
as Rapaccini et al. (2020) affirm there is “no evidence to assert that digital servitization 
could also be a weapon to make any business more resilient in the face of a crisis” 
(Rapaccini, et al., 2020), but at the same time there is evidence that “services have helped 
manufacturers to navigate through various financial crises, such as the Great Depression 
in the 1930s and the global recession of 2009” (Rapaccini, et al., 2020). The servitization 
literature already pointed out that there are differences in terms of revenue stability in 
times of economic crises between products and services (Adrodegari, et al., 2018) and 
that servitized business models and advanced services are more resilient. As Kwak & 
Kim (2016) stated, during economic fluctuations, servitization strategy can play a key 
role as countercyclical stabilizer.  
After having understood the importance and role of services and digitalization, in the next 
chapter we will try to investigate through an empirical analysis the level of digital serviti-
zation offered by companies in the North-East of Italy, and what role Covid-19 played in 
this process. 
The focus will be verifying if after a disruptive crisis such as Covid-19 one, companies 
have understood the importance of services and digitalization, and through them they 















































EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: “REAGIRE AL COVID-19 CON I 
SERVIZI E LA TRASFORMAZIONE DIGITALE” 
 
 
3.1 METHODOLOGY AND SURVEY’S STRUCTURE 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, services and digitalization have played a key role 
in creating an escape route for companies in times of greatest difficulty, such as during 
economic crises. 
The Covid-19, however, represented an entirely new crisis, with unpredictable times and 
ways and drastic impacts on society and economies in general. 
In Italy, the first European country to have known about the virus, the measures of social 
restriction have already been in place since March; the famous Italian lockdown has put 
in serious difficulty the economic fabric of the country, characterized mostly by small-
medium enterprises.  
Except for some ATECO codes linked to essential services, most companies had to close 
for a period of almost two months (from March 9 to May 3, following the Prime Minis-
terial Decree issued by the government). 
This forced closure has created imaginable damage for many Italian companies, espe-
cially production ones. The closure of factories and the quarantine of families had the 
dual effect of blocking both supply and demand for products.  
In many cases, even the companies that remained open by ATECO concession had many 
difficulties due primarily to logistical problems resulting from the lockdown, like the re-
sulting blockages of mobility between regions and between countries, and the short-gages 
in the value chain, from supply and sourcing of material to delivery to the customer. 
The feeling that has developed in this situation is that the business focused exclusively 
on the product offering has been the one most affected by the pandemic. Many companies 
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linked to the service offering were better able to survive, thanks in many cases to their 
ability to continue their offering with a digitized system that allowed them to maintain 
their business even during the lockdown. 
From this theory it was therefore decided to investigate whether companies with a busi-
ness model that is product-centric but also offers services in combination with the same 
product have somehow managed to survive better during the lockdown period.  
To do so, it was therefore decided to propose research that would analyse the conse-
quences of the Covid-19 crisis on manufacturing companies through a survey conducted 
in the field in order to have an extensive and relevant sample. 
The survey, called “Reagire al Covid-19 con i servizi e la digitalizzazione” was conducted 
in the period immediately after the lockdown, with the aim of understanding in what way 
companies would adapt to what has been defined as the next normal. 
Going into detail, it is important to focus on both the methodology used and the structure 
of the survey. 
 
Professor Paiola of the University of Padua is in charge of the survey, where he coordi-
nated a group of 3 master students (one of whom is the undersigned) in the various stages 
of the process: development and writing of the questionnaire, email campaign for delivery 
to companies, collection and coding of responses and elaboration of results. In detail, the 
timeline of the whole process is represented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 – Timeline (2020) 
March – May Lockdown in Italy regions 
June Writing of the questionnaire 
July - August Delivery of the survey to companies 
August - September Collection and coding of responses 
September Elaboration of results 
October Delivery of the Final Report to companies 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
The survey began to materialize immediately after the end of the lockdown and developed 
in the months immediately following, with the aim first of all to quantify the real impact 
of the health crisis due to Covid-19 on manufacturing companies, and then to understand 
the gradual process that led companies to a new normal; a process characterized by an 
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unforeseen crisis that was able to create a real watershed between business as usual and 
a new status quo in which health care attention and restrictions are an integral part of our 
lives. 
Central themes of this new normal have become the revision and innovation of business 
models, the modernisation and digitalisation of industrial value creation processes and 
the stabilisation of remote or smart working in organisations. 
Even more central is in general the future that awaits these companies; an increasingly 
uncertain future, in which it becomes essential not only to be content with an immediate 
reaction to the crisis, but where a strategic resilience must be developed that prepares 
companies for what will be the next normal. 
The survey has precisely this objective: to assess in depth the impact of the crisis on 
companies' business models and the role of digital technologies and customer services as 
an element of re-reading their relationship with business and the market in the near future. 
Specifically, to investigate these objectives, the survey “Reagire al Covid-19 con i servizi 
e la trasformazione digitale” was structured as follows: 
• Section 1: Master data, focusing on the size and scope of the company, the type of 
services offered and the relative percentage made up of services on turnover, the hard-
ware-software technological solutions used and the optimistic or pessimistic percep-
tion of the Covid-19 crisis, between opportunities and threats. 
• Section 2: Impact of the crisis and restrictive measures, with focus on companies 
forced to close during the lockdown, the resulting losses during that period, and the 
ability to react as effectively as possible. 
• Section 3: Reopening, where depending on the response period of each company (be-
tween July and August) an attempt was made to understand what adjustment there 
was on both the supply and demand side, and what were the main challenges to be 
faced. 
• Section 4: Digital transformation and reaction to the crisis, with particular attention 
to the companies' interpretation of what will be the main opportunities and challenges 
as a result of Covid-19, how much budget will be invested and how it will be divided 
between investments related to digitalization processes, supply chain relations, pro-
duction systems, after-sales services, the product-service system, the sales network 




In total a survey composed of 45 multiple-choice questions (excluding the personal data 
part), with most of the questions having a seven-rung Likert scale answer structure, with 
the aim of detailing the different perceptions as much as possible. The study was ad-
dressed to medium-large companies in Northern Italy, specifically manufacturing com-
panies (of any sector), companies that market industrial products and companies that pro-
vide services associated with industrial products (e.g. installation, maintenance and re-
pair, remote control, etc.). The respondents are owners, managing director, IT, sales, post-
sales and service managers, in general the Top Management Team of the companies. 
 
The research has respected the highest procedural and methodological seriousness. How-
ever, like any exploratory analysis of a phenomenon in continuous evolution, the present 
survey has its limits, due to the fundamental choices made by the researchers (the focus 
on medium-large manufacturing companies) and the need to compress the survey time 
(which necessarily limits the number of companies in the sample).  
The information and evaluations obtained are however of great interest, both for their 
topicality and for their specificity on productive themes and contexts in which in-depth 




3.2 GENERAL RESULTS 
 
The survey collected 80 valid responses from the Top Management Team of Italian com-
panies operating in the B2B, mainly from North-East Italy, which provided detailed in-
formation about a number of effects of the crisis on their operations and on planning and 
strategic investments in technology and services in the future. 
In detail, entering specifically into the characteristics of the companies that responded, 
the sample is divided exactly in half between small-medium enterprises (between 10 and 
250 employees) and large enterprises (with more than 250 employees), while no re-
sponses were collected from micro companies (less than 10 employees), also because it 
was considered that they could not be indicative with regard to the two main themes of 
the research: services and digitalization; in detail in the Figure 14 the composition ac-




Figure 14 – Companies size  
 
 
Source: Report “Reagire al Covid-19 tramite i servizi e la digitalizzazione” 
 
As regards the specific sector to which they belong, thanks to the ATECO classification, 
75% of companies belonging to the machinery and equipment manufacturing sector can 
be distinguished (of which 12% are food and beverage machinery), 5% are involved in 
the manufacture of metal products (excluding machinery and equipment), while 6% are 
involved in the marketing of wholesale products (excluding motor vehicles and motor-
bikes). The remaining 14% of companies are always in B2B with ATECO codes that do 
not fall under the previous ones, ranging from sectors such as the manufacture of plastic 
or leather products to maintenance and repair activities. 
After the general part of the master data, Step 1 goes into more detail on the levels of 
services and digitalisation present in companies. Starting from the offer of services, those 
more widely present are the so-called Product Life-cycle Services (PLS), i.e. those ser-
vices oriented to the product and that facilitate its use, such as product warranty (86% of 
the companies offer this service), sale of spare parts (84%), online documentation (80%), 
and active product training for the customer (89%).  Among the less widespread services 
in the offers are the more complex ones, the so-called Process Support Services (PSS) 
such as consultancy related to other companies' products (10%), and assistance and sup-
port to both marketing processes (20%) and R&D processes (35%). Figure 15 shows in 
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Figure 15 – Services offered 
  
 
Source: Report “Reagire al Covid-19 tramite i servizi e la digitalizzazione” 
 
Still rather infrequent are solutions and revenue models linked to innovative aspects such 
as cradle to cradle circularity models (with used take-back and end-of-life recycling) and 
those based on product-service systems oriented to use or result (pay-per-use or perfor-
mance); relevant is the importance of relatively modern value proposition elements linked 
to remote condition monitoring and digital technological retrofitting of products, to the 
use of e-commerce platforms in the relationship with the market, and to the implementa-
tion of maintenance services based on data analysis (which tend to be predictive). 
 
With regard to organisational coordination between product and service, the sample 
shows a rather traditional approach, with a high integration of service activities with the 
product function: for 56% of companies, all service activities are carried out by the same 
BUs that develop the products. However, the fact that the interviewees perceive that there 
is ample room for improvement in the offer and in the share of turnover of services within 
their company (in the specific for 55%) is counterbalanced by the fact that 75% of the 
companies in the dataset have a service turnover that contributes less than 20% to the total 
business. These dynamics, which also represent aspects of causality between them, will 
be analysed specifically in the statistical approach part. 
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Turning to the organizational-technological aspects, as regards the level of digitalization, 
and in particular the hardware-software equipment, almost all companies (91% and 99% 
respectively) usually use office automation tools (such as Ms Office, Suite Office 365) 
and platforms for remote meetings (such as Skype, MS Teams, Zoom); very present (90% 
and 79%) are also cloud solutions for sharing data and documents (as Google Drive and 
Dropbox) and ERP systems accessible via VPN: the presence of these systems seems to 
guarantee a basic equipment that has allowed most companies to adapt to smart working 
without too many difficulties. More difficult is the situation with regard to advanced com-
puterization systems of processes that require specific and large investments: among 
these, those less used (24% of companies) are those for the management of the Field 
Service Organization and solutions for data analysis and Artificial Intelligence (29%). As 
far as the implementation of the Internet of Things is concerned, at the good levels of IoT 
systems for the connectivity of products sold (53%) there are lower levels of IIOT on 
factory connectivity (30%). Noteworthy is the use of e-commerce in B2B, with one in 
four companies (25%) having a dedicated platform. In Figure 16 are represented the hard-
ware-software technological solutions in decreasing order of importance. 
 
Figure 16 – Technologies applied 
 
Source Report “Reagire al Covid-19 tramite i servizi e la digitalizzazione” 
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In Step 2 of the survey, the impact that the restrictive measures have had on the various 
company businesses is analysed in detail. Out of 80 companies, 44 had to close because 
of legislative decrees. Of these companies, 39 closed once, while 5 had to close and reo-
pen more than once. The average closure time was between 2 and 4 weeks, depending on 
when the companies were able to reopen, following the different ATECO codes of regu-
lations. 
The impact of the crisis on these companies has been important: an average loss is esti-
mated between 25-50% on production, orders and maintenance and repair services, and 
between 10-25% on spare parts turnover and all other services (contract, training, finan-
cial, rental and advanced). 
It is very clear how much the whole after-sales area suffered decidedly less than the prod-
uct area, starting from the spare parts business, passing from the rental business, to 
maintenance contracts and more advanced services. 
 
Remote working has been one of the aspects most accelerated by the crisis: considering 
the different types of activities, on average remote working has involved between 50 and 
75% of the time of each activity, with some company functions such as sales and market-
ing that have almost totally moved to a home working mode for employees. This accel-
erated adaptation has also been made possible by the use of company resources and staff 
skills that have proven to be more than adequate to deal with the emergency and specifi-
cally with the new way of working. In the companies that have remained open in partic-
ular, in addition to IT services, the most fundamental in guaranteeing the technological 
equipment to convert all the new needs, the merit is also acknowledged in particular to 
the after-sales services, which have contradicted each other for the effectiveness with 
which they have operated in a context that is even only logistically much more compli-
cated. 
 
In Step 3 of the survey, there is the theme of reopening, which together with the construc-
tion of the next normal, is the specific focus of the research. 
The activities that have returned to full speed (operations between 75-100%) are those of 
factory production and spare parts sales, while for the others (new orders and various 
services) operations do not fall below 50%. The use of smart working with the reopening 
has physiologically decreased, even if it continues to be between 25-50% and much 
higher than pre-Covid, especially for commercial-administrative and marketing roles. 
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As far as the forecast of market trends and demand in the near future is concerned, more 
than 50% of companies are confident of a gradual increase after the crisis and leading to 
normality, while 30% are worried about the risk of a protracted reduction of the market 
even after the crisis. In this context, the attitude in facing the new strategic challenges - 
unimaginable when thinking about pre-lockdown globalization levels - such as travel re-
strictions (both for commercial activities and field services) and the impact of the inter-
national phase shift of lockdowns on the supply chain and markets will be fundamental. 
Remaining on the subject of future prospects and analysing the challenges of implemen-
tation and maintenance of the investment budgets planned in the pre-crisis period, slight 
delays are expected due to Covid-19 on the implementation of 4.0 technologies (from 
IoT-IIoT, to AI, Robots, VR, 3D printing), while the digitalization of internal processes 
has been accelerated, thanks as seen before to the fundamental role that has played in 
responding to the emergency. 
 
In the fourth and last Step of the survey, the objective is to understand if and how the 
reaction to the crisis can accelerate the digital transformation, the one towards services 
and in the supply chain relations as strategies to face the next normal. 
In assessing different opportunities related to the future, one of the main ones is to over-
come the cultural barriers to digitalisation still existing within companies, indicated as a 
real prospect by about 80% of companies. Even stronger (about 85%) is the perceived 
opportunity to introduce new services in the offer: here we note that the proportion of 
respondents who consider the moment highly suitable to introduce new services (38%) is 
almost double that of those who consider it for the introduction of new products (20%). 
One company out of 4 (25%) also considers the moment highly suitable for entering new 
markets (diversification).  
In the next Figure 17, the answers on the evaluation of various opportunities provided by 
companies on a Likert scale from 1 to 7, are represented by grouping the values into low 









Figure 17 – Opportunities in the future 
 
Source: Report “Reagire al Covid-19 tramite i servizi e la digitalizzazione” 
 
Conversely, as seen before, the most real perceived threats concern the risks of market 
contraction and the uncertainty linked to new mobility. 
In details in the next Figure 18 are presented the different perceptions of companies about 
threats, with the same way of grouping as before. 
 
Figure 18 – Threats in the future 
 











































After assessing opportunities and threats, a series of questions analyse various areas of 
investment and initiatives over a time horizon that places them as planned within the year, 
in an undefined future, unforeseen or as a fourth case that they are already in place or 
undertaken before Covid-19.  
With regard to future digitalization processes, one of the most active areas of investment 
are data analysis and Artificial Intelligence solutions, with 13% of companies planning to 
carry them out within the year, and 27% in the future; in the near future investments are 
also planned for CRM management (25% of companies) and for factory 4.0 MES systems 
(22%). Specific investments in FSO management solutions and B2B e-commerce plat-
forms remain contracted. 
As regards supply chain relations, there is a certain urgency to restructure relations with 
partners in terms of economic conditions (to be carried out within the year for 36% of 
respondents), while the opening of new branches or offices abroad is a future option for 
13% of the sample. The closure of foreign branches or the centralisation of nodes and 
greater autonomy to existing branch offices do not seem to be priorities of the next nor-
mal.  
As concerns after-sales services, spare parts and field services, the structuring of the tech-
nical knowledge base is the most planned initiative to be carried out by the end of the 
year (16% of companies); in the short term there are also initiatives relating to predictive 
maintenance (46%) and the use of AI and ML for better customer service (35%). A good 
part of the companies in the sample already have remote control of products distributed 
with IoT systems (47%) and ticketing and helpdesk systems (50%). The use of 3D print-
ing for spare parts is not a priority (not expected in 75% of cases). 
As far as strategies relating to the product-service system are concerned, around 50% of 
companies intend to strengthen the service component in the offer (20% with the aim of 
pushing the services share of turnover within the year); the figure shows that, in particular, 
one company out of two (51%) will increase the offer of complete service product pack-
ages such as full-service contracts or advanced maintenance contracts (in 12% of cases 
within the year); finally, 13% will implement urgent changes in pricing and service rev-
enue models (within the year), while 30% intend it as a future commitment. Interesting 
though contrasting is the figure relating to the need to operate in the mitigation of client 
business risks: more than half the sample does not consider it, but almost one in three 
companies think it is something to be tackled in the future, a sign that the perception that 
the crisis is part of a next normal is perceived as real by a not insignificant number of 
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companies. On the other hand, initiatives concerning the restructuring of the spare parts 
logistics system with a greater decentralisation of quantities do not seem urgent. 
 
Figure 19 – Initiatives related to product-service system 
 
Source: Report “Reagire al Covid-19 tramite i servizi e la digitalizzazione” 
 
As for the relationship with the market and the commercial network, the picture is still 
interlocutory on advanced and digital initiatives, but not without interesting signals. Apart 
from the positive fact that almost two out of three companies declare to make use of social 
tools for corporate communications, other contrasting factors to be interpreted character-
ise the future choices of companies on a series of prospectively relevant issues. In fact, if 
the search for and recruitment of specific commercial figures for after-sales services and 
the investment in the training of figures for complex services are not foreseen by a sig-
nificant part of the companies (39% and 29% respectively), it should be underlined that 
the same initiatives have already been addressed by almost as many companies (33% and 
28% respectively). It should also be noted that training initiatives dedicated to commer-
cial figures dedicated to after-sales and complex services are in any case considered a 
strategic choice - certainly to be tackled in the future - by 43% of companies (one out of 
five considers it urgent). 
 
The latest questions of the survey concern the dedicated budget for the investments and 
initiatives just described; more than 40% will remain within an investment of 100,000 
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or one in five, plan to allocate a budget of more than 500,000 euros to the investments 
described in the preceding paragraphs. The relevance and impact of the current crisis on 
budgets is clearly sensitive (almost 40% of companies state that at least 25% of the re-
sponsibility for the levels of this budget lies with Covid-19); however, the number of 
companies claiming that investments expressly due to the emergency represent less than 
10% of the budget is 62%, i.e. almost two companies out of three; this testifies that the 
process of modernisation, service and digitalization has become part of the ordinary mind-
set of a part of manufacturing companies, even regardless of emergencies. 
 
However, the emergency has played a crucial role in these companies, as have services 
and technologies to mitigate its impact. Thanks to this report, a series of data and infor-
mation from a complex process of investigation into the response of manufacturing com-
panies to the health emergency by Covid-19 have been presented, and represent an excel-
lent opportunity to empirically deepen studies on these aspects. In fact, comparing the 
results of the survey with those obtained from the literature review conducted in the pre-
vious chapter, with particular reference to the paper by Rapaccini et al. (2020) and the 
four-step model of reaction to the crisis, further evidence can be drawn to confirm and 
implement a series of conclusions that describe the experience gained by Italian manu-
facturing companies in tackling the Covid-19 crisis and what are the action plans in pro-
gram to deal with the next normal. 
 
 
3.3 STATISTICAL APPROACH 
 
Before presenting these conclusions, which will be described in the final chapter, it was 
decided to use the sample, given its good size with 80 respondents on 45 responses, to 
carry out a more in-depth analysis that could provide more specific information through 
the use of basic statistical tools. These statistical tools have been applied using STATA 
as statistical software. 
Given the number of questions to which the various respondents were subjected, and 
which belonged to the different 4 steps of the survey on different moments and themes, it 
was decided to select only some of them, among other things verifying that they had a 
more quantitative character (and in this case the evaluation of the answer with the seven-
rung Likert scale was very useful) compared to other more qualitative variables. 
60 
 
The starting point was to adopt a specific focus on services, continuing the line of Adro-
degari et al. (2020) that in their paper come to point out the importance of services in the 
difficult process that leads a company to be more resilient. In times of crisis in particular, 
the authors noted that the sale of services has less impact than the sale of products. And 
among the services, the more advanced and digitized services are even more resilient. 
It was therefore spontaneous to reflect on whether, depending on the type and mode of 
services offered, the companies in the sample have actually acted in a more resilient way, 
and were able to cope better with the health emergency. 
After the part of master data, the first question of the survey specifically investigated the 
types of services offered by the companies to their clients, whether they were final or 
intermediate (remembering that the sample is composed of B2B companies). The 80 re-
sponding companies were asked in detail whether or not they offered 23 different types 
of services, with a distribution already shown in the previous paragraph in Figure 15. The 
idea was therefore to subdivide the sample of companies according to the type of services 
they offer; to do so it is therefore necessary as a starting point to classify the services, 
based on some objective criteria. 
To do so, a literature review was conducted on the models that characterize the different 
types of services; the most authoritative one has been found in the division of services 
between basic, intermediate and advanced proposed by Baines & Lightfoot (2013), which 
in their book "Made to Serve - How manufacturers can compete through servitization and 
product-service systems" define in detail the three levels of services. 
Their classification starts from the point of view of the companies (manufacturing com-
panies offering services are described in detail, and thus perfectly match the companies 
in our sample) and their relationship with the customer. 
Rather than the interplay of products and services, Baines & Lightfoot (20139 base their 
distinction on the value proposition to their customers; there are three kinds of customers-
organization that offer the service (identified by us) relations: 
• Customers who want to do it themselves, 
• Customers who want us to do it with them, and 
• Customers who want us to do it for them. 
 
From these three types of client needs, three types of services have been created that are 





• Base services are defined by an outcome focused on product provision and they 
are based on an execution of product competence (i.e. we know how to build it). 
Examples of base services are product/equipment provision, spare part provision 
and warranty. 
• Intermediate services are defined by an outcome focused on maintenance of prod-
uct condition and they are based on exploitation of production competences to 
also maintain the condition of the product (i.e. because we know how to build it, 
we know how to repair it). Examples of intermediate services are scheduled 
maintenance, technical helpdesk, repair, overhaul, delivery to site, installation, 
operator training, operator certification, condition monitoring and in-field service. 
• Advanced services are defined by an outcome focused on capability delivered 
through performance of the product and they are based on translation of produc-
tion competences to also manage the product’s performance (i.e. because we 
know how to build it we know how to keep it operational). Examples of advanced 
services are customer support agreement, risk and reward sharing contract, reve-
nue-through-use contract, and rental agreement. 
 
Figure 20 – Services classification 
 
Source: Made to Serve - How manufacturers can compete through servitization and product-service sys-
tems, Baines & Lightfoot 2013 
 
Following the indications proposed by the two authors, it was therefore decided to classify 
the services requested in the survey question according to the characteristics of the three 
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clusters just described. In some cases, an adaptation was mandatory, as technological pro-
gress has led to the offer of new services that did not exist at the time of Baines & Light-
foot (2013). This is how the 23 services of the survey have been divided as follows: 
 
Table 6 – Base, intermediate and advanced services 
 
BASE SERVICES 
PROMISE A PRODUCT PROVISION 
INTERMEDIATE SERVICES 
PROMISE A PRODUCT CONDITION 
ADVANCED SERVICES 
PROMISE A PRODUCT / PROCESS 
PERFORMANCE 
Installation Product demonstration Warehouse management 
Product warranty Cost/benefit analysis 
Consultancy related to other 
companies' products 
Online documentation Remote condition monitoring Financial services 
Sale of spare parts Products retrofitting 
Assistance and support to mar-
keting 
Disposal and recovery of ma-
chinery 
E-commerce Assistance and support to R&D  
Sale of used parts 
Active product training for the 
customer 
Data maintenance 
Reuse old parts Call center Pay per use per performance 
  Inspection/maintenance Preventive maintenance 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
After this subdivision of services into basic, intermediate, and advanced, the next step 
was to classify companies according to the services they offer. In order to do so, we started 
from the basic assumption that companies offering advanced services will probably also 
offer intermediate and basic services, whereas the two opposite cases are not true; this is 
because, as represented in the Figure, the three types of services are in fact each a subset 
of the other, with advanced services representing the larger set that includes the other two. 
For this reason, in order to classify companies with objective criteria, it was decided to 
start from those with advanced services. Specifically: 
• Advanced companies have been defined as those offering at least three out of the 
eight advanced services defined in the Table 6. 
• Intermediate companies, excluding advanced companies, have been defined as 
those offering at least five out of the eight services defined in the Table 6. 




Through this clustering, three comparable sub-samples have been obtained, not only in 
terms of units (respectively 26 advanced, 28 intermediate and 26 base companies) but 
also in terms of size of companies composing these samples. 
 
Table 7 – Base, intermediate and advanced companies 
 
 BASE INTERMEDIATE ADVANCES 
Tot companies 26 28 26 
Small (10-50 employees) 3 3 3 
Medium (50-250 employees) 13 13 5 
Large (>250 employees) 10 12 18 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
As represented in Table 7, the three subgroups are homogeneous also in terms of company 
size, which makes them comparable. 
This consideration is very important and should be underlined; there could in fact be a 
certain causality between the large size of a company and its ability to offer advanced 
services, which would make the clustering actually ambiguous with a variable "type of 
services offered" which in reality would only be a slightly different manifestation of a 
division based on company size. 
As represented in Table 7, this is not the case. The three groups are clustered according 
to the services they offer, and company size does not contribute to this division.  
 
According to this classification it was also interesting to verify that depending on the three 
groups there were no significant differences in terms of companies that had to close or 
stay open during the health emergency, following the corresponding specific survey ques-
tion. As shown in the Table 8 below, within the groups around half of the companies had 
to close, with slight differences in the advanced (65% of the companies closed), which 









Table 8 – Closed/opened companies during Covid-19 crisis 
 BASE INTERMEDIATE ADVANCES 
Tot companies 26 28 26 
Closed during crisis 13 14 17 
Opened during crisis 13 14 9 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
In the following pages some variables of interest, associated with specific questions of 
the survey, will be investigated with the specific objective of observing whether or not 
there were different effects depending on the level of service offered by a company. 
It was decided to classify companies according to the type of services offered, given the 
centrality of the topic, treated as the main subject during the survey. The technologies and 
the level of digitalization of a company could also be safely adopted as a variable to clus-
ter the sample; services and technologies have a certain correlation, which would have 
made the subdivision of the sub-samples based on technologies very similar to that carried 
out according to the services. 
To confirm this, the correlation has been conducted between the variable tot_services and 
tot_technologies, i.e. between the variable representing the sum of the services offered 
by companies, out of a maximum of 23 identified in the survey, and the variable repre-
senting the sum of the technologies provided by companies, out of a maximum of 16. 
As shown below, a simple correlation was first carried out, and then one using Spearman's 
coefficient, in order to have an additional proof of the significance of the test. 
 
Table 9 – Correlation between tot_services and tot_technologies 
 




tot_techno~s     0.4408   1.0000
tot_services     1.0000
                                
               tot_se~s tot_te~s
tot_techno~s            8.4     3.239784            2           16
tot_services           10.9     4.309542            2           20
                                                                  
    Variable           Mean    Std. Dev.          Min          Max
65 
 
Table 10 – Spearman’s correlation between tot_services and tot_technologies 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
Figure 21 – Graphic correlation between tot_services and tot_technologies 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
The figure above also depicts the 80 equipment of the companies of the service-technol-
ogy pair through a double-axis graph.  
The correlation of 0.4 is moderate, and higher values could be expected. However, as 
seen by Spearman's index, since the hypothesis of the two variables independent is false 
at the 99%, a positive correlation even if not very strong may be sufficient to conclude 
how the classification according to services or technologies would have produced results 
if not equal, very similar. This is to further confirm that the choice to classify according 
to services and not technologies has been purely arbitrary and motivated by the fact that 
in this paper there has been a greater focus on services than technologies, even if compa-
nies tend to have similar levels of both. 
    Prob > |t| =       0.0002
Test of Ho: tot_services and tot_technologies are independent
Spearman's rho =       0.4093






















Therefore, services and technologies often merge into a single offer and equipment by 
companies: digital servitization, introduced at the end of Chapter 2. Digital servitization 
which, as already seen in the description of the general results of the survey, appears to 
have an important relevance as an activating factor of resilience in companies. Precisely 
for this reason it was considered important to focus on the perception that companies will 
have of the next normal post-Covid, looking at the differences based on the level of ser-
vices, that implicitly represent diverse levels of resilience. 
 
One of the first variables taken into consideration concerns the total number of services 
offered by companies.  
The tot_services variable is an aggregated variable, which includes the sum of the ser-
vices that each company has claimed to offer; as represented in the Table , out of a po-
tential maximum of 23 services, it manifested itself with a minimum of 2 and a maximum 
of 20 services. On average, one company offers almost 11 services out of the total number 
of services offered. 
 
Table 11 – Summary of variable tot_services 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
In order to specifically observe whether, depending on the different levels of the compa-
nies' service provision, even the total average value is proportional, it was decided to 
conduct an ANOVA oneway test on the variable tot_services as the service_level varies, 









tot_services           80        10.9    4.309542          2         20
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Table 12 – ANOVA test on tot_services, factor variable service_level 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
The differences in total service values depending on the defined levels are statistically 
significant at 100%, as demonstrated by Fischer's F value. 
This variable is in fact defined as control and serves only to testify that, for example, 
companies at the advanced level generally have a more structured offer of services, which 
leads them on average to have a good offer of intermediate and basic services as well. 
On the contrary, companies at the basic level have an offer of services which is charac-
terised by basic services, but which, as we have already seen, is lacking compared to 
advanced and intermediate services. 
This assumption is very important because it gives validity to the operational selection 
made earlier on how the companies have been clustered in three groups. 
 
Another variable that for the same logic could be defined as control is the percentage of 
turnover due to services. This variable corresponds to a specific survey question and had 
to be coded as the response options included percentage ranges of different sizes. The 
encoding Table 13 shown below was based on taking for each percentage range the max-
imum value as the encoding value. 
 
Table 13 – Encoding table for services_turnover% 
Services turnover 
share 
<5% 5-10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-80% 80-100% 
services_turnover% 0,5 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
    Total               1467.2     79   18.5721519
                                                                        
 Within groups       397.53022     77   5.16273013
Between groups      1069.66978      2    534.83489    103.60     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total          10.9    4.309542          80
                                                   
   3.advanced     15.192308   2.2806882          26
2.intermedi..     11.321429   2.0737079          28
       1.base     6.1538462   2.4607691          26
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of tot_services
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Once the encoding has been determined with a choice that can be defined arbitrary, but 
which in any case respects the dimensionality of the intervals, the ANOVA oneway test 
is carried out to verify that the turnover is proportional to the total number of services, 
and in turn proportional to the three different service level. 
 







    Total           153.746875     79   1.94616297
                                                                        
 Within groups      144.534341     77   1.87706936
Between groups      9.21253434      2   4.60626717      2.45     0.0926
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total       1.80625   1.3950495          80
                                                   
   3.advanced     2.1730769   1.3110477          26
2.intermedi..     1.8928571   1.2645973          28
       1.base     1.3461538   1.5281965          26
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                   Summary of services_turnover%
    Total           105.592593     53   1.99231307
                                                                        
 Within groups      101.563187     52   1.95313821
Between groups      4.02940578      1   4.02940578      2.06     0.1569
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total     1.6296296   1.4114932          54
                                                   
2.intermedi..     1.8928571   1.2645973          28
       1.base     1.3461538   1.5281965          26
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                   Summary of services_turnover%
    Total           87.2083333     53   1.64544025
                                                                        
 Within groups      86.1497253     52   1.65672549
Between groups      1.05860806      1   1.05860806      0.64     0.4277
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total     2.0277778   1.2827472          54
                                                   
   3.advanced     2.1730769   1.3110477          26
2.intermedi..     1.8928571   1.2645973          28
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.





Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
The test shows that the percentage of turnover due to services is significantly different in 
90% of cases compared to the classification of companies according to their service level. 
The test conducted according to the three service levels indicates that at least one of the 
clusters is significantly different from the others; analysing specifically the three clusters 
in pairs shows that the difference on average between the values of the base and advanced 
companies is significant. This confirmation is very important, and in fact makes the ser-
vices_turnover% variable also a control variable with good significance. 
It can therefore be said that the three clusters of companies created represent groups of 
companies with significant diversity, both in terms of services offered and in terms of 
turnover deriving from these services. 
 
Understanding the relevance of the groups, and the justified differences that characterize 
them, one of the first relations that it has been decided to analyse is the couple of questions 
about the perception of the Covid-19 crisis first as an opportunity and then as a threat. 
The two questions, divided in the survey, were both measured through a Likert scale with 
increasing intervals from 1 to 7 and are analysed together to try to understand which of 
the two prevailed in the different groups of companies according to the service level. The 
different results divided by group are represented below, and the graphic representation 





    Total           110.245192     51   2.16167044
                                                                        
 Within groups      101.355769     50   2.02711538
Between groups      8.88942308      1   8.88942308      4.39     0.0413
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     1.7596154    1.470262          52
                                                 
 3.advanced     2.1730769   1.3110477          26
     1.base     1.3461538   1.5281965          26
                                                 
         el          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
service_lev      Summary of services_turnover%
70 
 







Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
Figure 22 – Box plot relation between crisis_opportunity and crisis_threat 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
crisis_thr~t           26    3.846154    1.804268          1          7
crisis_opp~y           26    4.576923    1.553656          1          7
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> service_level = advanced
                                                                                
crisis_thr~t           27    4.074074    1.838183          1          7
crisis_opp~y           27    3.740741    1.831195          1          7
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> service_level = intermediate
                                                                                
crisis_thr~t           26         4.5    1.655295          1          7
crisis_opp~y           26    3.653846    1.765045          1          7
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
-> service_level = base










As can be seen from the graphic representation, the distributions of the answers to the 
two questions vary greatly according to the three clusters. If, in fact, in companies offer-
ing basic services, the crisis appears more as a threat than as an opportunity, in those with 
medium and advanced services the trend is gradually reversing, with the latter perceiving 
the crisis more as an opportunity.  
Also, in this case, to understand whether the differences between the sub-samples are 
relevant or not, the ANOVA oneway test was conducted, first on the crisis_opportunity 
variable and then on that crisis_threat. 
 
Table 16 – ANOVA test on crisis_opportunity, factor variable service_level 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
Table 17 – ANOVA test on crisis_threat, factor variable service_level 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
    Total           238.987342     78   3.06394028
                                                                        
 Within groups      225.415954     76    2.9659994
Between groups      13.5713874      2   6.78569368      2.29     0.1084
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total     3.9873418   1.7504115          79
                                                   
   3.advanced     4.5769231   1.5536557          26
2.intermedi..     3.7407407   1.8311953          27
       1.base     3.6538462   1.7650452          26
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                   Summary of crisis_opportunity
    Total           243.468354     78   3.12138916
                                                                        
 Within groups      237.736467     76   3.12811141
Between groups      5.73188719      2    2.8659436      0.92     0.4044
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total     4.1392405   1.7667454          79
                                                   
   3.advanced     3.8461538   1.8042684          26
2.intermedi..     4.0740741   1.8381832          27
       1.base           4.5   1.6552945          26
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                     Summary of crisis_threat
72 
 
Looking at the test results, the differences in terms of perception of the crisis as an op-
portunity between the different groups are almost 90% significant, while the differences 
in terms of perception of the crisis as a threat are not significant. 
These results are interesting, and can be interpreted by detecting a similar perception of 
the crisis as a threat between the three groups, while there is a significant difference in 
the view as an opportunity, with advanced level companies likely to see in the accelera-
tion forced by Covid-19 the opportunity to continue to progress in the direction of digital 
servitization, already undertaken by these companies as seen in the previous chapter. 
 
To confirm this trend, it has been decided to undertake an in-depth analysis on another 
specific variable, linked to the previous one and which is based on the specific demand 
of the survey on assessing through the usual seven-rung Likert scale the opportunity to 
include new services in companies’ offer in the future. 
Also here on the first impact it would seem appropriate to expect a solution that sees the 
base companies in the front row towards the opportunity to increase their services and 
therefore to close the gap with the most served companies. But as the ANOVA oneway 
test below reveals, awareness of the importance of services seems to be winning out, and 
advanced companies recognise the opportunity to expand further probably due to the fact 
that they already have a substantial supply of services for their clients, they understand 
the importance and sure evolution in the future to implement them further. 
 




    Total               263.95     79   3.34113924
                                                                        
 Within groups      219.549451     77   2.85129157
Between groups      44.4005495      2   22.2002747      7.79     0.0008
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total         4.525   1.8278783          80
                                                   
   3.advanced     5.4230769   1.1017469          26
2.intermedi..     4.5714286   1.6426846          28
       1.base     3.5769231   2.1572775          26
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.








Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
The resulting test has a 99% significance considering the three groups together, and this 
result is translated in three tests considering only two groups at time that are each one 
significant: advanced companies consider the opportunity to include new services in their 
offer on average one rung higher on the Likert seven scale than intermediate companies, 
and almost two rung higher than base companies. 
 
    Total           202.537037     53   3.82145353
                                                                        
 Within groups      189.203297     52   3.63852494
Between groups      13.3337403      1   13.3337403      3.66     0.0611
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total     4.0925926   1.9548538          54
                                                   
2.intermedi..     4.5714286   1.6426846          28
       1.base     3.5769231   2.1572775          26
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                    Summary of new_services_opp
    Total           112.981481     53   2.13172607
                                                                        
 Within groups      103.203297     52   1.98467878
Between groups      9.77818478      1   9.77818478      4.93     0.0308
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total     4.9814815   1.4600432          54
                                                   
   3.advanced     5.4230769   1.1017469          26
2.intermedi..     4.5714286   1.6426846          28
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                    Summary of new_services_opp
    Total                  191     51   3.74509804
                                                                        
 Within groups      146.692308     50   2.93384615
Between groups      44.3076923      1   44.3076923     15.10     0.0003
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total           4.5   1.9352256          52
                                                 
 3.advanced     5.4230769   1.1017469          26
     1.base     3.5769231   2.1572775          26
                                                 
         el          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
service_lev       Summary of new_services_opp
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Always following the same line of reasoning, and therefore observing what the companies 
intend to do in the next normal and with what differences between the different groups, 
the last variable that we decided to analyse corresponds to one of the last questions of the 
survey, concerning the investment budget that companies intend to allocate for a series 
of initiatives aimed specifically at preparing themselves in the best possible way for what 
will be the next normal post Covid-19.   
The proposed investment ranges are in absolute value, and of different sizes, which is 
why a coding is required for statistical processing. The following proposed coding fol-
lows the opposite logic to the one made for services_turnover%, and takes as coding value 
the minimum value in range scales; this choice is due to the attempt to maintain propor-
tionality in the last range, which being open left few coding alternatives. 
 
Table 19 – Encoding table for investments_budget 
 
Investments budget 0-50.000 50.000-100.000 100.000-200.000 200.000-300.000 300.000-500.000 >500.000 
investments_budget 0 0,5 1 2 3 5 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Following this coding, the summaries of the variable's distributions according to the dif-
ferent groups and the ANOVA oneway test to understand the significance of the differ-
ences between groups are shown below. 
 
Table 20 – ANOVA test on investments_budget, factor variable service_level 
 
 
    Total           246.373418     78   3.15863356
                                                                        
 Within groups      221.391181     76   2.91304186
Between groups      24.9822364      2   12.4911182      4.29     0.0172
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total      1.778481   1.7772545          79
                                                   
   3.advanced     2.5384615   2.0876929          26
2.intermedi..     1.1964286   1.2644666          28
       1.base          1.64   1.6987741          25
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.







Source: Author’s elaboration through STATA software 
 
The results presented are very interesting, also because they are slightly contrary to what 
one might expect from the analysis of previous tests. In fact, if it is confirmed that ad-
vanced companies have a greater awareness of the importance of services and a strong 
and convinced reaction in overcoming the Covid-19 crisis, which is confirmed by the 
higher investment budget of around 300,000 euros on average; the difference lies in the 
difference in budget between intermediate and base companies. If in fact, as one might 
    Total           176.412037     53     3.328529
                                                                        
 Within groups      152.131181     52   2.92559964
Between groups      24.2808557      1   24.2808557      8.30     0.0057
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total     1.8425926   1.8244257          54
                                                   
   3.advanced     2.5384615   2.0876929          26
2.intermedi..     1.1964286   1.2644666          28
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                   Summary of investments_budget
    Total           188.509804     50   3.77019608
                                                                        
 Within groups      178.221538     49   3.63717425
Between groups      10.2882655      1   10.2882655      2.83     0.0990
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
      Total     2.0980392   1.9416993          51
                                                 
 3.advanced     2.5384615   2.0876929          26
     1.base          1.64   1.6987741          25
                                                 
         el          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
service_lev      Summary of investments_budget
    Total           115.028302     52   2.21208273
                                                                        
 Within groups      112.429643     51    2.2045028
Between groups      2.59865903      1   2.59865903      1.18     0.2827
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
        Total     1.4056604   1.4873072          53
                                                   
2.intermedi..     1.1964286   1.2644666          28
       1.base          1.64   1.6987741          25
                                                   
service_level          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                   Summary of investments_budget
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also expect from the tests carried out previously, the intermediate companies should in-
vest more than the base companies, the empirical evidence is the opposite, with the base 
companies investing on average more than 200,000 euros, while the intermediate compa-
nies are around 100,000 euros lower. 
This final result seems to be a source of pride for the base companies, which, despite the 
general difficulty shown by a perception of Covid-19 more as a threat and less room for 
expansion for services, allocate a larger budget, probably due to the fact that given the 
seriousness of the post-crisis situation, they understand how strong and decisive their re-
action must be. 
The conclusions drawn from this variable must in any case be taken with caution, first 
because the test conducted between intermediate and base companies is not relevant and 
secondly because the investment capacity of companies, for example due to total turno-
ver, is not being taken into account. This question was not present in the survey, but it 
was nevertheless decided to analyse the investments_budget variable taking into account 
that the three sub-samples were homogeneously distributed according to company size in 
terms of number of employees. In fact, company size is often related to company turno-
ver, which is confirmed by the micro-small-medium-large company size classification in 
Chapter 1, which takes both criteria into account. 
 
It is in any case necessary to reiterate how the results obtained by this sample have some 
fragility mainly due to a very good number of responding companies, but which some-
times does not reach the full statistical significance. On the other hand, the opportunity to 
have recent data on a current and sudden phenomenon such as Covid-19 could not but be 
exploited; the author's further personal choice of dividing the sample among companies 
with advanced, intermediate and basic service levels has made it possible to reach inter-
esting results through statistical analysis, which give indications on the current situation 
and what will be the next normal for companies in Italy in terms of services and digitali-
zation. 
In the next chapter the results obtained are summarised, starting from those of the survey 












FINAL RESULTS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
4.1 THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY 
 
In Chapter 3, as seen above, the empirical part of the work has been analysed, presenting 
the survey conducted by the research group of the University of Padua and adding some 
additional statistical elaborations proposed by the author. The results obtained from these 
elaborations have been deliberately only introduced, as they will be discussed and deep-
ened in this final chapter. 
Starting from the survey, it should be remembered that its starting aims were very closely 
related to the ones of the paper by Rapaccini et al. (2020). In this paper, "Navigating 
disruptive crisis through service-led growth: the impact of Covid-19 on Italian manufac-
turing firms", the authors focused on an analysis of the impact of the health emergency 
on the business of manufacturing companies in Northern Italy, one of the worst affected 
regions in Europe, through a questionnaire and interviews. The unpredictability of the 
crisis and its drastic effects led the authors to theorize the four step model (calamity, quick 
& dirty, restart, adapt) already presented in chapter 2, as an evolution of previous crisis 
response models, specifically adapted to face this year's emergency and support in man-
aging it. 
From the questionnaire and the interviewees, the most interesting results relate specifi-
cally to the role of services, which seem to increase their importance particularly in times 
of crisis; the service business is in fact more resilient than the product sales business, with 
the latter being hard hit especially in the industrial sectors analysed. Among the services, 
the most advanced ones are those less impacted by the crisis, also given their nature, 
which very often allow to offer the greatest value to the client with reduced physical 
presence of the supplier, which adapts to past lockdown times and which have often 
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involved the entire value chain, from the first supplier to the final client. Very often these 
advanced services have a strong digital component that becomes essential as a way of 
offering the service or as a true service itself. That is why, for example, technologies such 
as IoT, cloud and analytics make it easy to talk about digital servitization.  
In the wake of the paper of Rapaccini et al. (2020), the survey "Reagire al Covid-19 con 
i servizi e la digitalizzazione" has begun to be built up, with the aim of providing a further 
sample of data that focuses more on companies mostly from North-East of the country 
and have specific characteristics such as B2B operations. 
As can be deduced from the title, of the survey, a careful focus has been placed not only 
on services but also on the levels of digitalization of companies; services and digitaliza-
tion have been studied in detail as elements of strategic resilience that emerged in the 
phases immediately following the lockdown, with an express and specific focus no longer 
on the immediate reaction to the crisis (the calamity and quick & dirty phases), but on the 
foreshadowing of how organizations expect the future and what they intend to do to pre-
pare for it; in other words on the challenges of the transition to the next-normal that awaits 
manufacturing companies (the restart and adapt phases). 
 
Some very important general conclusions can be drawn from the specific analyses carried 
out on the main and most significant questions of the survey conducted in Chapter 3: 
 
• The importance of technological and organisational preparation; in uncertain and 
unpredictable times which, as seen in Chapter 1, lead to crises with increasingly 
recurring economic repercussions and much shorter cycles, is it important for a 
company to have adequate preparation to react adequately and quickly to possible 
negative external stimuli. Often this preparation, which leads companies to be 
more resilient, is implemented through suitable technological equipment and a 
flexible business ready to adapt. A classic example of preparation that has become 
fundamental in tackling Covid-19 has been the use of smart working, which from 
one day to the next required a series of organisational changes and technological 
equipment that not all companies have been able to offer to employees. Remote 
working has become fundamental above all in the ability not to lose efficiency in 
relations with other companies, suppliers and above all customers, relationships 
usually managed vis-a-vis each other and which have now been replaced by re-
mote meetings on dedicated platforms. 
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• Technology and services are resilience enablers; the centrality of connectivity 
technologies has been fundamental during the crisis to keep the service offering 
active for its clients. In fact, while during the lockdown the sale of the product 
was in many cases physically blocked even just because of transport limitations, 
the services continued to function. Even basic services such as maintenance and 
repair, which in any case require a physical presence on the part of the seller, have 
often become essential for customers who continued to produce during the lock-
down phase. While for customers who have stopped, services have nevertheless 
represented the possibility of maintaining the relationship between supplier and 
customer, especially when it comes to advanced technologies such as IoT, data 
analysis and the Cloud. Companies that managed to diversify their offerings and 
showed good levels of digitalization were inevitably more resilient than compa-
nies that, for example, were only product focused, saw their revenues fall to zero 
during lock-down. 
 
• A more mature awareness of the real challenges of the crisis; the Covid-19 crisis 
has uncovered financial and operational fragilities for many businesses that were 
present long before the pandemic. Companies have finally become aware of the 
economic uncertainty of recent years, and the importance of diversifying their 
business and making it as agile as possible. On this point, the statistical elabora-
tions in the next paragraph will specifically focus on the perception of the crisis 
as an opportunity or a threat, demonstrating how, depending on the different levels 
of servitude and therefore resilience, even the perception of the crisis can change. 
 
• Technology and services are complementary keys for interpreting the future; 
given the importance and indispensability of these two factors to face what will 
be the next normal, it is also necessary to clarify how in reality services and tech-
nologies are two sides of the same coin; digital technologies can in fact automate 
and make scalable a whole series of reporting, monitoring and remote control ac-
tivities that until recently had to be carried out specifically on the territory. At the 
same time, the offer of services, from basic to advanced ones, requires an adequate 
technological endowment, confirming the close relationship between the two fac-
tors. Moreover, digitalization, as never before in recent years, seems to have no 




The survey therefore highlighted the importance of Covid-19 impact on companies, often 
highlighting the positive aspects that such a major crisis could create in an economic 
fabric of companies that are often too immobile. The pandemic will characterize the next 
normal to be an accelerator or activator of digitalization and service-processes in compa-
nies.  
These processes will affect the entire ecosystem, from the market to customers and sup-
pliers who will change habits following a crisis that is bound to reward only those who 
demonstrate a resilient attitude. 
 
 
4.2 THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ELABORATION 
 
After the results obtained from the survey in general, it has been decided, as seen in the 
previous chapter, to exploit as much as possible the opportunity to have a current sample 
with a good number of observations to conduct more detailed analyses, investigating the 
diversity of some specific variables after classifying companies according to their service 
offer. The classification of services was decided because the topic is seen as one of the 
main focus of the paper, but clustering would have been similar even if it was decided to 
classify companies according to digital technologies, another big topic of the analysis. 
Taking up also one of the conclusions just described by the survey in general, services 
and digitalization often go hand in hand; a correlation between the distributions of the 
two variables aggregating the total offer of services and the total technological endow-
ment has been made. The resulting correlation is a positive average value, not too high 
also due to the elaborate nature of the two variables created, which inevitably do not 
differentiate within each of the two variables the specific services and technologies. How-
ever, when Spearman's test is carried out, the correlation is significant, especially thanks 
to the reliable number of the sample made of 80 observations. 
The empirical confirmation is limited, however, but useful to be able to state that the 
services-based classification also takes into account the level of digitalization, and as seen 
as these two factors activate resilience, by transitive property the three clusters of com-
panies represent three different levels of resilience. 
To cluster according to services, the classification of services provided by Baines, one of 
the most established and reliable sources on the issue of service-based services, has been 
81 
 
adopted. The 23 services in the questionnaire to which the companies were subject were 
divided into basic, intermediate, and advanced services. 
Once these three groups had been determined, following a criterion as much objective as 
possible, specific analysis was carried out on some variables corresponding to specific 
questions, observing the different results among the groups. 
The first analyses were carried out on variables that can be defined as confirmatory, as 
they try to testify the goodness and correctness of the subdivision. For this reason, it was 
necessary to have confirmation of the homogeneity of the three groups both as regards 
the size of the company (measured by the number of employees) and whether or not it 
was closed during lockdown. These two variables in fact could have interfered with sub-
sequent analyses, while having confirmation that each of the three groups has similar 
proportions of small, medium and large companies, and that about half of the companies 
in each group had to close (slightly more as far as the advanced ones are concerned), and 
the other half managed to keep open confirmation that the characteristics of the three sub-
groups are not caused by these two effects. 
 
Another variable that can be defined as control concerns the percentage of total turnover 
explicitly due to services; also here the resulting values are in line, with advanced com-
panies that have a higher average percentage of turnover from services than intermediate 
companies, with the latter in turn having higher levels than the base. The results are in 
line with the forecast, which confirm that as the offer and type of services increase, the 
relative percentage of turnover also increases. Statistically, the difference in average val-
ues between advanced and base companies is significant. It would have been interesting 
to investigate specifically whether there are differences in profitability depending on the 
type of services, investigating whether advanced services are more profitable than inter-
mediate or base services. This was not possible, as the classification between the different 
types of services was made ex-post by the survey, and the questions did not allow to 
specifically analyse this effect, which remains a good starting point for further research. 
 
One of the most interesting results concerns the perception of the Covid-19 crisis, be-
tween opportunity and threat. As widely anticipated, the analysis of these responses sees 
a prevalence of the perception of the crisis as an opportunity for advanced companies, a 
general balance of responses in intermediate companies, and a prevalence of the crisis as 
a threat to base companies. 
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These results confirm the line already drawn, and add an important link between what is 
the present for companies, represented by their equipment and level of supply, and what 
will be the future, the next normal of the coming months characterized by uncertainty and 
the profound changes that the pandemic has brought and will bring. Advanced companies 
that have anticipated a resilient organisational structure characterised by services and dig-
italization, have much brighter prospects for the future and look at Covid-19 as an accel-
erator that will enable them to implement new solutions involving digital servitization 
and improve those already implemented. They are also confident that the whole ecosys-
tem of suppliers and customers understands its importance, as has been the case with 
remote working and meeting platforms, for example, which have become part of compa-
nies and will remain for many a permanent solution in corporate working practices. 
For base companies, however, Covid-19 is of much more concern; these companies have 
had difficulty implementing adaptation solutions in dealing with the crisis, which in many 
cases have been emergency, and without adequate preparedness. There is not yet the 
awareness that Covid-19 may have given the necessary push to innovate the Italian eco-
nomic system, and instead the pessimism linked to the financial difficulties that these 
companies, like all of them, are suffering, linked to the reduction in sales and the conse-
quent slowdown in production, prevails. The next normal that is in prospect for them is 
darker, uncertainty prevails and the main risk for these companies is not finding adequate 
solutions to renew their business and be more resilient; in this way the gap between ad-
vanced and basic companies is destined to increase. 
 
As confirmation, there are significant results on the variable in which companies have 
assessed the opportunity to introduce new services in the near future (which may coincide 
with the next normal). The results are perfectly in line with the previous point; advanced 
companies, already proven in the world of service-based services, know that Covid-19 
has brought drastic changes also in terms of ways and customer preferences, and for this 
reason it will become fundamental to push the offer of services, both product-related and 
non-product-related, with the aim of having a generally more diversified offer, to normal-
ize revenues and make them less and less dependent on economic cycles, and thus make 
the company more resilient. 
The core point that is still not perceived and understood by the base companies, which, 
depending on the financial level in which they are, risk leaving a market where digital 
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innovation will no longer be a choice, but a requirement to be part of what will be the 
next normal. 
Intermediate companies, so far not analysed in detail, represent average values between 
the two classes defined above; here they perceive the crisis as an opportunity and threat 
at about the same level, and evaluate the offer of new services with significantly lower 
values from advanced companies, but also significantly higher from base companies. 
This last consideration is very relevant: the statistical validity of the tests conducted on 
the variable new_services_opp, and the significance of the differences between the values 
of each group and the others, testifies that these results are reliable, and can be an efficient 
tool to anticipate and predict the behaviour of companies towards digital servitization in 
what will be the next normal. 
 
The last variable considered concerns the budget that will be expressly allocated for in-
vestments to react to Covid-19; here too advanced companies confirm with facts their 
expectations to implement the offer of services and the equipment of new technologies, 
and are ready to invest on average higher amounts than the other two groups. 
Intermediate and grassroots companies, however, are not losing too much ground, and in 
any case have good levels of investment expected, although significantly lower than ad-
vanced companies. 
Between intermediate and base companies there is the partial final surprise, with base 
companies investing on average more than base companies. It is, in fact, credible that in 
any case the base companies, warning of the threatening situation brought by Covid, be-
lieve they will have to make necessary investments in the future, above all linked to sur-
vival as long as the emergency lasts. To this is probably added a delicate financial situa-
tion, which sees in these investments the opportunity to recover in the immediate future.  
What is worrying, therefore, is where these investments will be directed, but above all 
with what purpose: to satisfy short-term needs or to begin to undertake a project that will 
lead the company to a more innovative and flexible business, characterized by resilience 
based on services and digitalization, a criterion that seems to be increasingly fundamental 







4.3 LIMITS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The results just summarised are of undoubted and unquestionable interest, and represent 
real observations obtained by similar enterprises concentrated in a unitary geographical 
area, where the consequences due to the impact of the Covid-19 crisis had similar and 
comparable times and ways. 
However, it is also necessary to point out the limits of the empirical analysis carried out; 
first of all, the survey collected the responses of 80 companies, which, although repre-
senting a good-sized sample, cannot represent the totality of the companies. As a second 
point, it should also be pointed out that the structure of the survey was based on questions 
that assessed the perceptions of a single respondent for each company, which makes the 
answer subjective according to the individual's perception. Precisely the survey was ad-
dressed to the Top Management Team of each company, trying to have the most reliable 
answers given the level of experience and skills of each individual in relation with their 
company. 
As far as the statistical elaborations are concerned, the author decided to further subdivide 
the total sample into three groups (base, intermediate and base companies); if on one hand 
this choice made it possible to obtain results that differed according to the level of services 
of the companies, finding interesting cues such as the different perception of what the 
companies will do in the next normal, on the other hand the total sample described above 
was further divided, with three sub-samples of 26, 28 and 26 companies respectively, 
which although homogeneous, represent small numbers for sample elaborations. Even 
with these numbers, most of the tests selected and presented in the elaboration have pre-
sented significant results, which can therefore be taken into consideration. However, it 
should also be pointed out that, as in the case of the ANOVA oneway test conducted, the 
underlying hypotheses provide for a similar variance of each variable (and this criterion 
was respected) and also a normal distribution (which was not verified given the small 
number of observations). 
The limitations just described represent a weakness of the elaboration carried out; against 
the opportunity to have a sample however with a good number, especially considering 
that the answers are of companies and not of individuals, and concerning a current phe-
nomenon and carried out in a short time, it allows to have a characteristic and unique 
analysis, with equally unique results, which can be useful first of all for companies to 
understand the importance and the role of services and digitalization as resilience factors, 
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4.4 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
In conclusion, it is necessary to retrace the main steps of this work. In fact, starting from 
the economic crises that have characterised the last twenty years, we have arrived at what 
is destined to be the crisis that will change the economic world most in the coming years. 
The Covid-19 pandemic has totally changed the habits and behaviours of all market play-
ers, with production companies that have suffered the effects of this crisis in the first 
place, but are also those with more opportunities and potential for improvement. 
One way to do this is to use services and digitalization, factors that are increasingly evolv-
ing and that together make companies more resilient. 
Organizational resilience is in fact the main antidote to combat the uncertainty that has 
characterized the last twenty years and that is destined to characterize the post-Covid 
world, the next normal. 
Through the empirical survey and the related statistical elaborations, it was first of all 
confirmed how resilience can be achieved through digital servitization, a new concept 
that provides for the offer of services that need suitable digital tools to implement them, 
and also how services and digitalization are actually two sides of the same coin. 
After dividing the sample into three groups according to the levels of services offered by 
companies, it was also discovered that services and digitalization are more and more 
sources of competitive advantage; an advantage that was built up over time, before the 
Covid-19 crisis, and that allows the most resilient companies to look with greater opti-
mism at the near future, identifying the outbreak also as the opportunity to accelerate an 
innovative process that is too late in our country. Services and digitalization are undoubt-
edly two areas with great potential in the market over the next few years, and companies 
that fully understand this phenomenon will be able to benefit more from it. 
Those companies that did not take this path before the crisis will inevitably find them-
selves in difficulty; in November 2020, the time of conclusion of this work, the health 
emergency is returning, the discovery of a vaccine seems still far away and new legisla-
tive decrees alternate from week to week making the near future increasingly uncertain. 
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The hope is that the next investments will not only focus on bridging the gap in the emer-
gency, but that they will have a look to the future, laying the foundations for adapting to 
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